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Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015 515Political Economy in Prehistory
A Marxist Approach to Pacific Sequences
by Timothy Earle and Matthew SpriggsDevelopment of strong leaders and social stratification in prehistory is suitable for a political economy approach to
the longue durée. Our goal is to encourage archaeologists to formulate prehistoric research that draws on historical
In p ro-
polog
Illino
Profe
polog
Natio
Terri
was s
20 V
q 201materialism, the Marxist reasoning for understanding political economy. Three prehistoric cases from the Pacific
(Lapita, Vanuatu, and Hawai‘i) help us evaluate the steps required to do this. Most importantly, we identify eco-
nomic bottlenecks (constriction points) based on property rights for land or on production and trade of prestige
goods. Resources can be mobilized by emergent elites at such bottlenecks to support strategies that enmesh land
managers, captains, warriors, and priests to centralize power. A political economy approach in prehistory can help
explain striking parallels observed for independent sequences as well as conjunctures and divergences in specific
world culture areas.
rehistory, there was a time before strong leaders and so- “In the primitive societies that are studied by social anth
cial stratification. Whether strong leaders emerged depended
on their success or failure controlling the political economy,
pologists there are no historical records” (Radcliffe-Brown
1952:3). Archaeology, however, can reveal thatmaterial record,using warrior might, and fashioning a validating cultural ethos
(Earle 1997; Mann 1986). Any theory of social inequality must
consider how such power was controlled and resisted. Al-
though political economy approaches to social inequality and
power have primarily concerned modern worlds of markets
and capitalism, these same approaches can be generalized for
longer-term comparative studies of archaeological sequences.
Our method continues a long tradition of political econ-
omy studies in ancient human history. Relying on the ethno-
graphic accounts of Lewis Henry Morgan (1877) and others,
Marx (1967 [1867]) and Engels (1972 [1884]) saw opportu-
nities to explain long-term evolutionary trends (see Spriggs
1997c for sources). Drawing on the rich ethnographies of the
twentieth century, US anthropologists (Fried 1967; Sahlins
1958; Service 1962; Steward 1955; White 1958; and, recently,
Bowles, Smith, and Mulder 2010) formulated popular evolu-
tionary models; however, because they looked only at con-
temporary groups (without actual historical sequences), their
work became heavily criticized as conjectural history. The
leading British social anthropologist of the time said bluntly,
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the means to look at how specific archaeological histories have
resulted in striking parallels, conjunctures, and divergences.
V. Gordon Childe (1942) was inspirational in efforts to
integrate archaeological evidence with a political economy
(Marxist) approach to understand how human societies de-
veloped (Trigger 1980). At the end of his career, Childe (1958)
evaluated his life’s work in archaeology, sensing that, al-
though his approachwas correct, archaeology lacked themeans
to study political economy effectively. At the same time, how-
ever, US archaeologists were developing new methods to do
just what Childe desired. Steward’s focus on settlement pat-
terns and White’s on energy inspired a generation of archae-
ologists elaborating materialist understandings of prehistory
(Willey and Sabloff 1974). A lively debate emerged among US
archaeologists as to the efficacy of ecological, political, and
structural ways to understand change (Adams 1966; Blanton
et al. 1981; Earle 1978; Flannery 1972; Gilman 1981, 1989;
Hayden 1983). Although much of the US processual tradition
is generally grounded in Marxism, US scholars were reluc-
tant to identify themselves explicitly as Marxist, perhaps be-
cause of the lingering sense that it was “un-American.”
Among British scholars, the encounter with Marxism dur-
ing the 1970s was different (McGuire, O’Donovan, andWurst
2005). It came into British archaeology via French Marxist
cultural anthropology, mediated by Jonathan Friedman and
Jack Goody.1 Friedman’s (1974) paper “Marxism, Structural-
1. Jack Goody ran the first UK undergraduate seminar course
in Marxist anthropology during the mid-1970s at the University ofserved. 0011-3204/2015/5604-0002$10.00. DOI:10.1086/682284
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ism, andVulgarMaterialism”provided a rallying cry for young
European archaeologists. Friedman and Rowlands (1978)
crafty political operatives, exemplified by Machiavelli’s Prince,
seizing on whatever means available to gain and retain power.
such relevant journals as the Journal of Political Economy and the Journal
of Australian Political Economy.
516 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015applied a structural Marxist analysis to understand prehis-
toric political economy in Europe and Asia, while Spriggs
(1984) edited a book onMarxist archaeology that also adopted
a structural perspective. But Friedman’s criticism of “vulgar
materialism” felt dismissive to US processualists, who often
withdrew further from engagements withMarxism. Historical
materialism fragmented into feuding camps, allowing Ian
Hodder (1982) to create without coherent response an anti-
materialist reasoning to archaeology drawing on postmod-
ernist theory. The limitations of his postprocessualism are
now recognized, and creative responses call for expanded and
dynamic materialism (Brumfiel 1992) and “processualism
plus” (Hegmon 2003). We believe that a political economy
(Marxist) approach should be foundational to the renewed
processualism.
Archaeologists should emphasize what we do best—
studying actual sequences in the longue durée. Dedicated to
building a science-based understanding of human history
within a broadly Marxist paradigm, we examine historically
interrelated sequences from the Pacific to illustrate the po-
tential strengths of a new synthesis. We describe how control
over property was the likely foundation for the emergence of
stratified Polynesian societies and, under different conditions,
how dominant control was effectively resisted to create more
decentralized structures in much, but not all, of Melanesia.
Generalizing a Political Economy Approach
Political power involves an ability to maneuver a group to act
together in the leader’s interest, which often conflicts with
the interests of others. We emphasize how problematic po-
litical power really must be. In some senses power is dis-
tributive, meaning that it inherently spreads out through
societies. Individuals and groups attempt to access existing
sources of power to further their interests. “The history of
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”
(Marx and Engels 2012 [1848]). If we generalize the analy-
sis of class conflict, social evolution can be seen as a power
struggle between social segments (kin groups, communities,
ethnic groups, political factions, and regional polities) in
shifting, decentralized fields of power (see Brumfiel 1992; Saitta
2005). How, then, does the concentration of power occur?
We emphasize that elemental powers derived from economy,
warrior might, and religious ideology (Earle 1997; Mann 1986).
Each of these sources has unique properties and social conse-
quences, and together they derive from control of the means of
production, of coercion, and of symbolic legitimation. None
of these was dominant, because would-be leaders used them
opportunistically. Political power was always a work in prog-
ress, as likely to dissolve as to be augmented. Chiefs were
Cambridge. Its influence on a generation of young scholars in both
anthropology and archaeology has been underappreciated.This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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power sources, each used to reinforce the others. The political
economy was, however, the fount for surplus used to expand
all powers.
The political economy in the past involved an economic
structuring to channel resource flows (food, labor, wealth,
and weapons) to finance power strategies. Political economy
approaches may sometimes verge on all-encompassing so-
cial philosophies (Roseberry 1989), but we prefer to return to
Marxist roots, emphasizing the ways that economic flows
structure political relationships and general well-being.
During the Industrial Revolution, a political economy ap-
proach emerged to understand how economies satisfied peo-
ple’s needs and desires. Adam Smith (1778), measuring the
wealth of nations through consumption, argued that increas-
ing specialization and free markets lowered commodity prices,
thus increasing well-being for all. He wanted to break the
power of sovereigns to offer monopolies (bottlenecks) to in-
siders. Smith’s ideas were radical—to establish unregulated
markets to free people from the monarchy and landed gen-
try. Ricardo (1817 [1811]) conceptualized emerging condi-
tions of land, labor, and capital that created a class structure,
where landowners received rents, capitalists received profits,
and laborers received wages. He believed, however, that small-
scale production and trade, typical of the time, allowed open
entry to profitable enterprises such that competition would
keep profits within reason. But neither Smith nor Ricardo could
imagine the ensuing changes in the Industrial Revolution,
when steamships, trains, and large factories created monopo-
listic control over capital. The world of robber barons, exer-
cising monopolistic powers, was what Marx (1967 [1867]) saw
and challenged. Constrictions in capital flows created seem-
ingly limitless opportunities to concentrate wealth. For exam-
ple, Vanderbilt concentrated 5% of all US wealth within his
grasp (Stiles 2009:4). Rule by the sovereign, so overtly rejected
by Adam Smith, was under threat of replacement by a ruling
capitalist class. Although partly offset by antimonopolistic
laws, crony capitalism still infuses the political process, and ex-
traordinary income inequalities persist. Modern political econ-
omy analyses continue to study the ways that property rights
channel flows of materials, commodities, and labor to structure
social inequalities and political power.2 As the twenty-first
century progresses, income inequalities nationally and inter-
nationally are reaching deplorable levels.
We aim to investigate these themes in the time before
modern history, when local agricultural production and trade
in wealth goods dominated political economies. InKarl Marx:
Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, Hobsbawm (1965) intro-
2. The literature on political economy is vast, subdivided along dis-
ciplinary lines that cannot be reviewed here. The reader is referred to9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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duces Marx’s writings on premodern economies to highlight
Marx’s attempts to investigate the full sweep of human his-
rigation system over which a chief asserts ownership. Com-
moners receive plots of irrigated land in return for corvée labor
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 517tory. The quality of evidence available to Marx was, however,
totally inadequate, and now we can get the historical details
right. Systematic and rich data allow archaeologists to address
such important theoretical questions (Smith et al. 2012). Some
will find our tactics unacceptable, because they are not true to
Marx’s original analyses. Although foundational to our think-
ing, we seek to extend his thinking to the very different con-
ditions of prehistory. A political economy approach can help
to identify alternative patterns of development that archaeolo-
gists now are recording (Flannery and Marcus 2012; Spriggs
2013; Trigger 1998, 2003).
Political Economy in Prehistory
“Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic
nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human
history” (Engels 1883:1). Our analysis of the political economy
in prehistory requires the identification of conditions respon-
sible for emergent social stratification and political control.
Marx believed that change must be understood in terms of his-
torical materialism, the specific economic conditions that al-
lowed the domination of one group (class) over another. Histor-
ical materialism never entails a simple reduction to economic
factors, because economic relations are structured socially and
politically. The realities of domination depend on the modes
of production, including technology, property, and social rela-
tions (Hobsbawm 1965). To simplify Marx’s analysis to one
that can be applied across history, we stress that the develop-
ment of central power and social stratification was grounded
in conditions that created bottlenecks, allowing hierarchical
property relations to emerge (cf. McGuire 2008b).
Bottlenecks are constriction points in commodity chains that
offer an aspiring leader the opportunity to limit access, thus
creating ownership over resources, technologies, or knowledge.
Ownership facilitates the extraction of surpluses as corvée la-
bor, rent, or other payments that fund power strategies. Bot-
tlenecks emerge as unintended consequences of environmen-
tal conditions (such as highly productive land) or as intended
consequences of strategic actions (such as construction of for-
tifications overlooking trade routes). The emergent potential to
control strategic points is, as we see it, the selective mechanism
for change. A political economy approach by archaeologists
should work to reveal bottlenecking dynamics across the full
spectrum of societies, from small scale and egalitarian to large
scale, autocratic, and highly stratified (McGuire 2008b; Saitta
2005), with alternative pathways to complexity (Blanton and
Fargher 2008; Blanton et al. 1996; Ehrenreich, Crumley, and
Levy 1995; Gilman 1995; Kristiansen 2007; McIntosh 1999).
We reject any unilinear sequence of development but look for
shared processes that influence long-term change along alter-
native pathways.
Although bottlenecks constrict commodity flows, that con-
striction is relative, never absolute. Take, for example, an ir-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tand other obligations. But commoners are not powerless, be-
cause their labor alone makes the irrigation system productive,
and alternatives (with costs determined by specific historical
conditions) always exist. If corvée obligations are too onerous,
farmers can move to work for another, less exploitative chief
or can move outside the sphere of chiefs to construct inde-
pendent farms. The relative constriction of the chief ’s irriga-
tion system is based on the cost to farmers to move away.
Another example of a bottleneck is crafting symbolic items,
such as highly decorated pottery, that can be controlled by
chiefs patronizing gifted artisans. But if the ceramic technol-
ogy is not sufficiently elaborate and esoteric to restrict knowl-
edge and skill to a very few artisans, others can produce copies
that serve effectively, and chiefly control over the object is re-
duced. For the prehistoric chief (and archaeologist), the ques-
tion must always be the degree to which control can be exer-
cised—a balance between chiefly strategies and competition
versus commoner evasion and subversion.
To analyze prehistoric sequences from a political economy
perspective, archaeologists should start with concrete ele-
ments of the general economy (see Sayer 1987). Objects pro-
duced, traded, and used in prehistoric economies represent
a wide spectrum of things with subsistence, social, and sym-
bolic values (Bell 2004). Each object involves a commodity
chain through which it was made, exchanged, and used. To
construct a model of the political economy, we identify those
things that mattered most in particular societies and then
examine their commodity chains for potential bottlenecks
that would allow surplus extraction. First, we examine the sub-
sistence sector of traditional economies, geared to providing
food and objects of everyday life (Earle 2002). Then we examine
production and distribution of bodily decoration, weaponry,
and the like used to define identity, group membership, social
networks, status, and political ideologies (Friedman and Row-
lands 1978; Hayden 1983).
Bottlenecks offer would-be chiefs the possibility tomobilize
surplus of staples or wealth, but often no effective control
points existed, andmobilization of surpluses was problematic.
We envision that a political economy method must consider
not only the centralizing potential of bottlenecks but also the
countervening opportunities for commoners to act free from
elite control. The important point is that political economies
effective for extracting surplus could be constructed only in
certain situations (D’Altroy and Earle 1985), and in tradi-
tional societies independent commoner actions characterized
most situations (Robin 2013).
Political economies can be heuristically characterized as
based on staple and wealth (prestige-goods) finance depend-
ing on the objects mobilized from particular bottlenecks
(D’Altroy and Earle 1985). Chiefs were political actors who
rose and fell as control points for key objects changed.
For staples, commodity chains were short; a farming family
typically produced food for personal use and for exchange9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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with neighbors. A potential bottleneck must have involved
access to agricultural land and other resources over which
We illustrate how to build models of these emergent po-
litical economies with three prehistoric cases (figs. 1, 2). The
Excluding some earlier-settled islands in Micronesia (Carson
518 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015chiefs could assert ownership. As terracing, drainage, and ir-
rigation improved agricultural land, elites could assert own-
ership to extract rents on these highly productive and limited
resources. Warrior might and religious ideology guaranteed
chiefly ownership often associated with permanent facilities
(terracing and irrigation), and monumental construction de-
fined patterns of corporate ownership (Blanton et al. 1996).
For prestige goods, bottlenecks were more varied, with
many possible points of control, such as along the extended
commodity chains of metal crafting and trade in Bronze Age
Eurasia (Earle 2013; Friedman and Rowlands 1978). Points
of control included ownership of mines or boats, restricted
trade routes along major rivers, and work by highly skilled
artisans. Warriors interdicted and/or protected movements
of wealth and prestige.
Compatible with the reasoning proposed here, world-
systems analysis (Frank 1993; Friedman and Friedman 2008;
Wallerstein 1974) aims at the macroeffects of international
trade and exchange flows. Our focus, rather, is on the smaller
scale of individual societies, where conditions (often impli-
cated in larger-scale processes) created opportunities for con-
trol at the local level. World systems did not expand to remote
Pacific islands until later than the periods being considered
here.
A Political Economy Approach
to Pacific Prehistory
Three archaeological sequences in the Pacific illustrate how a
political economy approach helps to understand the parallel
and divergent trajectories of long-term change. With at least
an implicit political economy reasoning, major scholars have
investigated evolutionary variation in the Pacific (Dow and
Reed 2013; Goldman 1970; Hommon 2013; Kirch 1984,
2010; Sahlins 1958; Younger 2012). With the exception of
Kirch, however, these scholars have made little use of archae-
ology. We ask fundamental questions of the archaeological
record: How and when did chiefs come to power in Melane-
sia and Polynesia? What do these cases reveal about the dif-
ferent pathways to power through the political economy?
When Lapita (and, later, Lapita-derived) populations col-
onized the Pacific Islands both close to and distant from
continental areas, would-be leaders confronted varying op-
portunities to establish political economies, some creating
complex chiefdoms or even states. Alternative, more open
political systems were also established. Although each colo-
nizing population in the Pacific evidently arrived with some
structure of social inequalities, the initial inequity was ap-
parently suspended, as open possibilities existed in newly
discovered islands. To lesser or greater degrees, the societies
of Oceania subsequently developed (or redeveloped) struc-
tures of power independently and quite differently, one is-
land group to the next, based on specific conditions within
their political economies.This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR TLapita phenomenon represents the political dynamics of
colonization; subsequently, the Vanuatu case illustrates the
alternative pathways of development across a single island
group in Melanesia; and the Hawaiian case represents the
singularity for the emergence of state-like polities in Poly-
nesia. The evidence is presently inadequate to test our models
fully; rather, our comparative method should be seen as for-
mulating productive avenues for research that we hope will
encourage ongoing collection and analysis of archaeological
data.
Lapita2013), Lapita consisted of the founding population from
which all Austronesian Pacific societies arose. Lapita culture
appeared abruptly sometime around 3300 BP in the Bis-
marck archipelago, signaling significant migration and rapid
spread of many Lapita social groups across the Solomon
Islands and colonizing Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji, Tonga,
and Samoa (fig. 2). The pattern of colonization was expan-
sionistic and purposeful, relying on effective navigational
knowledge and technology (Irwin 1992). The goals were
probably to search out undiscovered islands that could of-
fer easy subsistence, exchangeable products, and a basis for
leaders to establish themselves independently (Hayden 1983).
Initial settlements were widely scattered, suggesting that
small populations were located along the beaches on little and
large islands. As Lapita groups moved into the Pacific, their
culture and social forms were changing. Although Lapita po-
litical organization is poorly understood, Green (1994, 2002)
and Kirch (1997) argue for simple chiefdoms or similar midsize
polities.
Lapita was defined by a distinctive decorated pottery and
similar artifact inventories, including decorative shell objects,
small stone adzes and obsidian, and small coastal settlements.
The Lapita subsistence economy included hunting (rapidly
depleting land fauna), reef fishing, and small-scale, diverse
farming. To understand the political economy of Lapita, we
looked for potential constriction points in staple and wealth
production and exchange. We believe that the mobilization of
staples was unlikely to finance power relationships among
Lapita groups, because wild lands and reefs and shifting fields
for extensive agriculture were probably open to all. Staple
finance and its corvée labor characteristically involved mon-
umental architecture (Blanton et al. 1996), and no such con-
structions are found in Lapita settlements. In addition, except
for display ceramics, evidence of large-scale feasting is lack-
ing, suggesting that local leaders could not easily mobilize
staples for competitive displays. Probably no property bottle-
necks existed for Lapita, and individuals acted with few con-
straints in subsistence procurement.
Friedman (1981, 1982; Kirch 1991) argued, however, that
wealth moved between Lapita social groups through exchanges9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
erms and Conditions
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 519meaningful artifacts probably included many symbolic ob-
jects. Lapita prestige goods include the impressive Lapita pot-
tery elaborated with beautifully executed geometric dentate-
stamped decoration, sometimes on quite large forms; personal
decorative items of shell; probably bird feather and woven
products; and perhaps obsidian and stone adzes.
Lapita pottery carried rich symbolic meaning (Summer-
hayes 2000, 2001). The upper parts of the pots were decorated
before firing by straight and curved toothed stamps impressed
into the wet clay (fig. 3). Simplified versions of Lapita designs
were produced by linear incision rather than stamping and
may represent domestic rather than ritual vessels (Spriggs
and Bedford 2013). The largest pots, however, would have
required considerable skill both in their slab construction and
in their elaborate designs that often incorporated anthropo-
morphic heads and geometric infilling. Such pottery with
complex iconography probably served ritual functions. The
earliest pots carry complex designs produced by the finest
dentate stamps. Later Lapita pots exhibit coarser stamping
and simpler designs, suggesting a decline in decorative skill as
the salience of the iconography faded (Best 2002).
Despite similarities in execution and iconography, which
were broadly spread through the Lapita zone, the vast ma-
jority of Lapita pots were locally manufactured at most LapitaThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tand Spriggs 2013) shows that only 11% (n p 12) were im-
ported, at least 8% from the neighboring archipelago of New
Caledonia and some 3% from islands farther north in the
archipelago or beyond. The imported pots were no finer or
more distinctive than the local pottery that was the bulk of
the inventory. Many alternative production locations, where
iconographic patterns were copied, would have eliminated an
effective bottleneck.
Marine shell ornaments are found in Lapita sites and rep-
resent a diverse but standard inventory across the Lapita range
(Szabo 2010a, 2010b). Prominent are Conus anklet/bracelets
of shell segments sewn together (Bedford et al. 2010:156),
narrow Conus rings and beads, Tridacna bracelets and rings,
long beads of Tridacna and Spondylus shell, and various pen-
dants. Many shell elements may have formed composite or-
naments. Although specialized manufacturing of shell orna-
ments for exchange is likely (Kirch 1988b), in more recent
large-scale excavations shell manufacturing appears to have
been widely distributed, and so production would have been
difficult to control. Although some forms would have required
considerable skill and time to make, no obvious control points
existed in their production or trade.
Feathers were probably also important prestige items
among the Lapita. The extensive use of feathers in personalof prestige goods. From archaeological evidence and ethno-
graphic parallels among descendant communities, socially
sites. The detailed provenience study of 112 vessels from
Teouma on Efate Island in Vanuatu (Dickinson, Bedford,
Figure 1. Map of the Pacific Ocean showing the central location of the Hawaiian Islands and the insert area for figure 2. Prepared by
Mark Hauser.9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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Figure 2. Maps of the spread of the Lapita cultural complex and of the Vanuatu archipelago. Prepared by Stuart Bedford and Mark
Hauser.This content downloaded from 130.56.64.29 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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decoration is known ethnographically among descendant
Pacific groups, and trade in feathers was common histori-
because the small and minimally modified flakes would have
been unsuited to carry social meaning (Sheppard 1992). The
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 521cally (Swadling 1996). In light of the iconography on the
Lapita pots and the faunal remains of nonfood bird species
(Stuart Hawkins, personal communication), brightly colored
feathers probably served for headdresses and other personal
ornaments.Many dramatic bird species were distributed across
the region, and their colorful and exuberant feathers were
probably highly valued. On the basis of ethnographic analogy
and linguistic reconstruction, fine ceremonial mats and bark
cloth could also have served as prestige goods, although they
are unlikely to have survived archaeologically. Many sources
for the feathers and mats would have precluded effective re-
strictions to flows.
Other possible prestige goods included obsidian tools and
metavolcanic adzes, the former often obtained from consid-
erable distances and well-attested archaeologically. The ex-
tensive (but low-volume) movement of obsidian, which comes
from sources in the Bismarck archipelago, has been thought
to be socially significant (Kirch 1991), and obsidian flakes
were the only archaeological material that Friedman (1981,
1982) used to model Lapita prestige-goods exchange. We ar-
gue, however, that Lapita obsidian is an unlikely prestige object,This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tsmall and simple stone adzes, sometimes traded from island
to island during the Lapita period, also seem unsuitable for
display.
Did bottlenecks exist in Lapita prestige-goods exchange?
Many items must have served in Lapita society to mark status
with meaning. These objects were both locally available and
obtained from a distance. All prestige goods, including the
pottery, feathers, and stone, had local alternatives, which
meant that they were virtually uncontrollable. The skilled
labor invested in the most elaborate Lapita pots or the best
shell pieces may have marked distinction, but control over
these media would have been at best only partial. Neither the
clay or filler for the pots nor the shells would have been suf-
ficiently limited in availability to constrict production. The
skills needed to manufacture the shell jewelry and the smaller
pots were technically quite simple so that many crafters could
have made them, although admittedly of variable quality
(Chiu 2007). Everyone would have been able to access Lapita
pots or shell pieces, although some distinction would still
have been gained by having objects of the highest quality and
size (cf. Clark 2007). We conclude that bottlenecks (effectiveFigure 3. Example of a decorated Lapita vessel (full height, 21.5 cm). Photo by Stuart Bedford. A color version of this figure is
available online.9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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constriction points) largely did not exist in Lapita commodity
chains, with the consequence that the political economy was
as the original “supercommunity” (Gosden and Pavlides 1994:
168) became diluted, marking the end of an identifiable and
The sequences of the Vanuatu archipelago exemplify post-
3. Details appear in Stuart Hawkins’s forthcoming PhD dissertation
at the Australian National University.
522 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015open and competitive.
Alternatively, the ownership of sailing craft and organizing
specialized open-ocean crews could have offered would-be
chiefs partial control over the movement of goods (Hayden
1983; cf. Malinowski 1922 and Brunton 1975). We imagine
that distant voyaging created some potential for a small-scale
hierarchy within Lapita groups but that local alternatives
for status objects and the lack of a property system to mobi-
lize staples would have made such a political economy only
weakly channeled to support power relationships.
Long-distance symbolic relationships among Lapita groups
were apparently more significant than a controlled trading
economy. The key appears to have been local craftspeople
knowing an elaborate and broadly spread iconography with
elements of sacred knowledge held by a few initiates (Chiu
2007). Able to handle technically difficult production steps
and knowledgeable of iconographic intricacies, gifted special-
ists produced the largest and most elaborate Lapita pots (Clark
2007), probably in ritual acts, offering only limited potential
control by political leaders (cf. Spielmann 1998). An example
of the ritual acts of Lapita production could be the unusual
overpainting that obscured original dentate designs (Bedford
2006a). Perhaps part of a secret society (as known ethno-
graphically for descendant Pacific societies), the knowledge of
powerful symbols could have traveled more than actual pots
(see Hayden and Villenueve 2013). Control of ritual knowl-
edge, however, would have been largely situational and so dif-
ficult to extend to political power unless materialized by con-
trollable objects.
Lapita tattooing may have been linked to shared symbolic
representations that were more likely to build group identity
than political power. Decorative motifs on Lapita pottery in-
clude human heads with elaborate geometric patterns prob-
ably representing decorative bodily modification (Green 1979;
Summerhayes 1998). Skills in tattooing, for which the distri-
bution of obsidian is perhaps a proxy, may have supported a
weak political hierarchy based on sacred knowledge. The ob-
sidian graver may have served for scarification or tattooing to
carry such symbolic meaning (Kononenko 2012). But alter-
native materials, such as bamboo, served well for scarification,
and so control of obsidian exchange could have been of little
significance. Ceramic and obsidian trade was thus probably
simply a symptomofwhatwas important, the iconography that
early on linked societies across an open, oceanic realm. We
visualize Lapita as a competitive and rather accessible political
forum that was the engine driving rapid colonization of the
Pacific Islands. Leaders may have gained rank on the basis of
success as navigators, traders, and discoverers, but exclusion
was most probably quite limited, such that all people poten-
tially could have participated openly.
Toward the end of Lapita, long-distance exchange disappeared,
and the design system on the pots became simplified, indicat-
ing increased regionalization. Cultural diversification increasedThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Twidespread Lapita culture. Diverse pottery styles replaced
Lapita across its extensive distribution, certain shell ornament
types dropped out of use, and what was a single Proto-Oceanic
language began to break up into archipelago-specific subgroups.
Across their range, scattered Lapita pioneering populations,
who relied on high levels of interaction, grew into larger self-
sustaining communities (Pawley 1981; Spriggs 1997a:152–162).
As populations grew and became more locally distinct, the
support for long-distance travel declined—spouses were avail-
able locally, and exotic goods were increasingly replaced by local
equivalents. The continuing story is represented well by the pre-
historic sequences of Vanuatu.
VanuatuLapita societal transformation in the western Pacific. The
modern state of Vanuatu consists of 14 main and many
smaller islands spread north to south from the Solomon Is-
lands toward New Caledonia (fig. 2). Around 3000 BP, Lapita
groups colonized these unoccupied islands, among the first
to be settled outside Near Oceania (Bedford 2006b). Coloni-
zation involved distant voyaging; the initial journey across
open ocean from the Solomon chain to the Reef-Santa Cruz
group exceeded 300 km. Post-Lapita changes involved a sim-
plification of societal structure, a settling in to local condi-
tions, and the establishment of local corporate groups, even-
tually in some locations with hierarchical polities. We believe
that the shift to and intensification of agriculture formed
a new political economy based on local conditions that, to
some measure, allowed the mobilization of staples within sys-
tems of property rights.
Changing subsistence characterized the Vanuatu sequence.
Extinctions occurred in the endemic fauna; the land croco-
diles and large land turtles disappeared within a few hun-
dred years of settlement (White et al. 2010), as did many bird
species (often flightless) and fruit bats. Populations began to
concentrate increasingly on domesticated pigs and chickens
for protein, the former requiring agricultural intensification
to feed them.3 Many food crops found in Vanuatu were La-
pita introductions, including root crops (yam and taro), ba-
nanas, and other fruit trees (Horrocks and Bedford 2005,
2010; Horrocks, Bedford, and Spriggs 2009; Osmond 1998).
Studies of reconstructed vocabulary at colonization reveal var-
ious agricultural practices (swidden agriculture, fenced gar-
dens, and yam mounds) but no early vocabulary for irrigated
agriculture (Osmond 1998:138–140). Reduced size ranges of
marine shellfish and pollen and geomorphological evidence of9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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hill-slope erosion document environmental changes and ap-
parent agricultural intensification.
cluded shell and circular pig tusk armbands, shell bead strings
and belts, and other special items. According to oral tradition,
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 523Mortuary practices reveal compelling evidence for a changed
political economy. Starting with the Lapita cemetery of Teo-
uma on Efate Island, central Vanuatu, complex burial rites in-
volved manipulating skeletons, such as removal of heads, and
other skeletal elements suggest extended revisiting of burials.
The cemetery was a place where ancestors were encountered
as participants in a living cross-generational society (Valentin
et al. 2011). In the cemeteries of the succeeding 2 millennia,
simple inhumation replaced these complicated Lapita rituals.
The burial of intact bodies represents a shortening of mortuary
activities to a single primary event, representing a changing
societal relationship between the living and the dead. Descent
rather than group membership was emphasized (cf. Thomas
2001 for British Neolithic funerary practices). The concern, we
suspect, was to establish land inheritance through descent from
particular ancestors.
Across this transition, population increase created more
sedentary, island-specific lifestyles. Settlements became larger,
and densities increased. Some settlements were abandoned,
apparently due to resource depletion, while settlements shifted
to island interiors, opening up new lands for agriculture. After
a millennium, abandoned settlements were reoccupied, mark-
ing a transition to full-land occupation (Spriggs 2010). As daily
life became focused locally, exotic goods and associated reli-
gious ideas of Lapita were no longer salient. Chiefs had to find
other bases for power or were destined to lose it. In fact, the
post-Lapita Vanuatu groups appear to have taken a striking
egalitarian turn. With extensive land available for settlement,
if a leader became overly assertive, people could move away.
To attract followers, chiefs emphasized competitive feasting
that required the mobilization of staples.
Within the past 1,000 years, the number and kind of grave
goods increased and the burial ceremonies became elaborate,
suggesting some emergence of hierarchy. Many of the mor-
tuary forms in central and southern Vanuatu show Polyne-
sian influences with references to chiefs. The practice of ritual
sacrifice of individuals accompanying chiefs in death has di-
rect Fijian parallels (Valentin et al. 2011:62). The significance
of Polynesian and Fijian influences is not, however, to be
found in trying to map these patterns onto Vanuatu practices,
but the presence of hierarchically structured Polynesians in
the archipelago and renewed long-distance contacts with Fiji
changed how Vanuatu chiefs could operate. Practices were
not borrowed from outsiders but rather provided a new arena
for display in ways not seen previously (Valentin et al. 2011).
Clear hierarchies developed; large numbers of prestige goods
accompanied dead chiefs and their sacrificed wives and re-
tainers. Shell items appear dramatically in chiefly burials in
Aneityum and most extravagantly in the burial event found on
the islet of Retoka off Efate. Here, according to oral history,
Roimata, the influential chief of a broad region, was buried
along with at least 45 others who were ritually killed and then
arranged formally around his body. Bodily adornments in-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tthis cemetery materialized a newly formed chiefdom (perhaps
the largest in Vanuatu), as chiefly influence and, perhaps,
control extended across the island of Efate and smaller islands
(Garanger 1972). Staples mobilized by chiefs probably sup-
ported the recruitment of specialized warriors needed to back
up such influence, as documented for the Polynesian island
of Futuna (Kirch 1976). Where irrigation did not exist, con-
quest warfare could expand the region under a chief ’s control.
Increased social distinctions involved fundamental local
changes in the political economy to one based on staple mo-
bilization. As agricultural systems were intensified, contrasts
emerged among islands across Vanuatu based on their degree
of institutionalized power linked to potential property con-
strictions. On the southern island of Aneityum and in scat-
tered locations elsewhere, groups constructed irrigation sys-
tems to intensify agriculture (Spriggs 1986). Increased erosion
caused by pioneering agriculture on upland soils created
new alluvial deposits in the lowlands of some islands where
the offshore topography and reef conditions allowed (Spriggs
1985, 2010). Where the new alluvium built up, farmers con-
structed large agricultural complexes with irrigation canals,
creating an engineered landscape in which chiefs could claim
ownership and mobilize staples as rent. The result was the
emergence of territorial chiefdoms like those in Polynesia.
On other islands to the north, a more open political hi-
erarchy of grades emerged, suggesting a property system that
did not involve a permanent, built agricultural infrastruc-
ture. But it could be highly productive, creating the possi-
bility for surplus extraction where property rights could be
established. Ethnographic descriptions from the descendant
groups on Malakula illustrate how this could be done. Depo-
sition of volcanic tephra from eruptions created highly fer-
tile soils that supported intensified dryland farming. A person
wishing to take a grade in the political hierarchy sponsored a
large ceremony that required the killing of full-circle tusked
pigs—knocking out the upper canines allowed the lower ones
to grow and circle back into the jaw. Progressively higher
ranks required more elaborate feasting events and the killing
of more pigs. These pigs were labor intensive, requiring hand
feeding to protect their tusks. The tusks of sacrificed pigs be-
came bodily decoration of elite persons and key elements of
ceremonial masks and human-form sculptures, known as ram-
baramp in southern Malakula (Deacon 1934). These sculp-
tures were life-size likenesses of dead chiefs with their skulls
used to model the heads. These skull sculptures helped estab-
lish lineage histories of chiefs within a new forged hierarchy
concerned with rights to surplus.
The construction of pig altars and large standing stones
at ceremonial plazas commemorated the chiefs who erected
them and their associated grade-taking ceremonies (fig. 4).
Such monuments required social labor and its coordination
to haul and erect the stones, which were often carved. The
erection of large stone monoliths made permanent the mem-9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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personal labor and land relationships, on which an elemen- memory of social events and encumbering obligations. Con-
524 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015tal staple finance system became based. Polity sizes of these
societies would have rarely reached a thousand. They were
unstable and difficult to maintain, and hierarchy was often
challenged. In some parts of northern Malakula, the entire
male community of a particular generation took a grade at
the same time, seemingly to deny hierarchy based on any-
thing but age (Layard 1942). Women too could take grades
in many parts of northern Vanuatu. There were also areas
of Vanuatu where intensified agricultural systems did not
develop because of ecological constraints. Here, no strategic
points of chiefly control existed, and more egalitarian political
structures were prevalent.
Variation in political economy across Vanuatu apparently
resulted from diverse conditions of intensification that gen-
erated distinct property systems and alternative means to
mobilize staple surpluses. The extent and nature of hierar-
chy across the islands of Vanuatu were highly variable, from
Polynesian-like chiefdoms based on irrigation to relatively
egalitarian age-graded societies. When feasible, property sys-
tems were materialized in the engineered landscapes of irri-
gation systems owned by the chiefs. Where irrigation was im-
practical but land was still highly fertile, chiefs could build aThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tstruction of monumental places established permanent chiefly
positions and associated rights to labor. Across Vanuatu, a
mosaic of power emerged that was both variable and dynamic.
People became tethered to place primarily by attractions of
highly productive agriculture and associated ceremonial elab-
oration. If a chief became too assertive in demands for surplus
and labor, people could vote with their feet, moving to per-
haps less desirable locations but ones with more generous
chiefs or no chiefs at all.
Although objects of wealth were increasingly important to
mark distinction in Vanuatu, this development was second-
ary because crafts had few control points in manufacture and
trade. Items of distinction were made of local materials and
produced by relatively simple technologies. Control over ac-
cess to materials or their manufacture would have been dif-
ficult. As a competitive wealth finance system developed over
much of northern Vanuatu, the focus of wealth became based
on raising pigs with artificially engineered full-circle tusks.
Such a system was possible only because of the highly pro-
ductive agricultural soils, and the limiting factor was the labor
invested in raising the full-circle tusked pigs, which could not
forage for themselves.ory of display events as a means to institutionalize the inter- ceremonial landscape with labor, and monuments held the
Figure 4. Stone pig-killing tables, Peterhul nasara (ceremonial ground), Vao Island, Malakula, 2003. Photo by Stuart Bedford. A
color version of this figure is available online.9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
erms and Conditions
To conclude, as Vanuatu populations expanded, the pos-
sibilities for chiefly control increased irregularly. Competi-
2012; Hommon 2013; Kirch 2010, 2012; Sahlins 1958, 1985),
but we emphasize the dynamics of the Hawaiian Islands’ po-
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 525tive feasting was perhaps a common pattern for establishing
hierarchical relationships among social groups, with the limits
of chiefly power set by the extent to which they could extract
surplus and fund elaborate ceremonies (cf. Beck 2003). Con-
trol of irrigation works on some islands was clearly an at-
tractive route, producing Polynesian-like chiefdoms. But many
Vanuatu islands are naturally fertile, and the basis for chiefly
control was problematic, requiring legitimation through cere-
monial elaboration and an ideology of reciprocity.
Incidentally, for the Solomon Islands, the archipelago to the
north of Vanuatu, Bayliss-Smith and Hviding (2012, 2014)
discuss malaria as a major constraint to population growth
and therefore to agricultural intensification (cf. Kirch 2000:83–
84). In the Solomons and Vanuatu, a significant gradient ex-
ists in malarial incidence from the malarial north to the near
malaria-free southernmost islands and from lowland to high-
lands within some islands. Where malaria was prevalent and
the population remained low, agriculture was not intensified,
and so the built environment associated with property systems
was absent. Across island Melanesia, we envision a mosaic of
societies with differentially intensified landscapes that created
a full gradient in the power based on property. The islands in
Vanuatu that developed the most hierarchical chiefly systems
had intensive irrigated agriculture; these were relatively unaf-
fected by malaria. New Caledonia, for example, is malaria-free,
as is Fiji, the next archipelago to the east, and all of Polyne-
sia. Powerful chiefs could operate staple finance economy
based on intensive taro irrigation. As people colonized Fiji and
deeper into Polynesia, the development of staple finance econ-
omies created full resource use within circumscribed produc-
tive zones (Carneiro 1970).
The Hawaiian IslandsThe Hawaiian chain of six major islands is located just below
the Tropic of Cancer at the northeastern apex of a triangle
defining the extent of Polynesian islands in the central Pa-
cific (fig. 1). The Hawaiian Islands are unusual for both their
large sizes and extreme isolation. Polynesians colonized the
Hawaiian Islands late, about 1000 BP, and, with the excep-
tion of a short period when oral traditions mention contacts
with Tahiti, the Hawaiian Islands remained physically re-
mote until “discovery” by Captain Cook. Polynesians found
rich and extensive volcanic and alluvial soils, to which they
brought domesticated plants and animals to realize a great
productive potential. Although dynamics in the political econ-
omy were similar to those described for the Lapita and Van-
uatu, the rich and extensive land areas permitted population
growth unconstrained by malaria and eventually led to large-
scale staple mobilization that supported the formation of pre-
historic pristine states. We follow here the footsteps of scholars
who have analyzed the singularity and importance of structural
transformations in the Hawaiian case (Flannery and MarcusThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tlitical economy as foundational to its evolutionary change.
The developments in the political economy and political
organization in Hawai‘i followed a trajectory already famil-
iar from Vanuatu. Not unlike the Lapita colonists of Vanu-
atu 2 millennia earlier, a small group of Polynesian explorers
would have found and occupied the Hawaiian Islands. Ini-
tially reliant on coastal fishing and scattered farming, they
shifted more toward simple agriculture, expanding their set-
tlements inland onto upland soils. Nothing during these early
stages suggests effective control points that could have helped
leaders mobilize surpluses. We de-emphasize the founding
structural principles of inequality as determining subsequent
social evolution, looking rather at the historical conditions cre-
ated through the Hawaiian Islands’ long sequence of changes.
As populations grew, we can assume that the Hawaiian
Islands filled in with settlements increasingly dependent on
intensified agriculture and associated facilities. This process
of intensification on isolated islands circumscribed the built
landscape, creating the basis for a property system used to
mobilize surplus (cf. Carneiro 1970; Kirch 1988a). The filling
in would have limited a local community’s options, creating
control opportunities in local subsistence that offered chiefs
opportunities to mobilize surplus.
Clearing the upland forest accelerated erosion and created
a rich alluvium on the valley bottomlands (Spriggs 1997b).
Wetland taro agriculture had probably been used since first
colonization, but sometime after 800 BP Polynesian farmers
expanded it to cover new alluvial soils spotted throughout
the Hawaiian Islands. Although the chronology of irrigation
deserves further study (Bayman and Dye 2013), some fine-
grained data are available (Kirch 2010:143–145; McElroy
2012). The extensive engineered landscapes came to include
irrigated pondfields for taro, fishponds, tree groves of ba-
nanas, breadfruit, and coconut as well as newly constructed
religious monuments, roads, and division walls. In one ex-
ceptional case on Maui, historical data reveal that a chief or-
ganized people to carry quantities of soil to cover barren
lava flows to create productive irrigated farmlands on a sterile
landscape (Handy 1940:110). Although commoners retained
broad access to local resources (Dye 2010), elites controlled the
most productive staple-producing lands.
The new political order established taxing units (ahupua‘a)
with overarching ownership vested in the paramount, as his
close kin and supporters received units as fiefs and the com-
moners received subsistence plots. The ancient lineage sys-
tem through which commoners claimed rights to land was
supplanted by a feudal-like system in which commoners gave
obligated labor and material in return for access (Hommon
2013; Kirch 2012). Especially on the eroded western islands
of O‘ahu and Kaua‘i, where irrigation was most developed,
subsistence plots in the irrigated systems were divided among
farmers (Earle and Doyel 2008; fig. 5). Under a manager’s
oversight, commoners were obliged to work plots and fishponds9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
erms and Conditions
Figure 5. Abandoned irrigated taro field complex at Ha‘ena, Kaua‘i, 1971, showing the divisions into management sections, irri-
gation ditches, and a section of walled terracing (Earle 1978, figs. 6.3, 6.4). Prepared by Eliza Earle and Mark Hauser.This content downloaded from 130.56.64.29 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
set aside for the chiefs, generating surpluses to support
chiefly objectives (Earle 1978). The intensified irrigation fa-
(Kirch 2010). The conclusion is that state formation created
a distinctive class of rulers who asserted ownership over com-
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 527cilities were developed wherever possible, and they became
highly productive zones, although they were but a small
fraction of the total land area (Earle 1980). Concentrated in
the lower valleys, the largest systems were easily dominated
by chiefs, serving as bottlenecks for staple production (Mc-
Coy and Graves 2010). But commoners were not without
agency even within these situations. They could, and did,
move between communities when exploitation became ex-
treme. Many small irrigation systems were located in the
remote backs of large valleys and on small streams, where
commoners may have farmed relatively free from chiefly over-
sight (Earle 1978).
The potential for irrigation was much lower on the younger
(less eroded) eastern islands of Maui and Hawai‘i, where val-
leys and river systems were few (Ladefoged et al. 2009). Here,
the staple-based political economy emerged first in core zones
and then expanded through the building of extensive dryland
systems. Walls and terraces subdivided dryland fields, pre-
sumably defining property rights and obligations, much as in
irrigation complexes. Although dryland zones were less pro-
ductive and more risky, their productivity for pig husbandry
may have been high (Dye 2014, with commentary). Because the
dryland fields produced mainly sweet potato, an ideal pig food,
these fields could support large pig herds, a moveable wealth
critically important as ceremonial offerings and gift payments.
Dryland farmlands were not equal; some areas were more
productive, lower risk, and substantially more engineered with
terraces than others (Ladefoged and Graves 2008). Like the
irrigated areas, these core dryland zones would have served as
control points producing staples and staple-fed pigs for the
political economy.
The state-like polities of Hawai‘i were formed by conquest
that depended on both warrior and priestly specialists (cf.
Carneiro 1970). To develop individual large-scale polities, mo-
bilized resources were poured into a warrior elite, power spe-
cialists expanding the spatial extent of their polities (Kirch
2010). Structurally, conquest helped to formulate an ideology
of the stranger king distant from commoners and linked to
divine powers (Sahlins 1985). Territorial conquest broke local
community ownership rights, creating an overarching title held
by the ruling paramount. Where based more on intensive
dryland farming (as on the Big Island of Hawai‘i), the physical
extent of the polities had to be greater, and a new institutional
order became based more on those warriors and on a priestly
class attached to the paramountcy (Kirch 2010).
To institutionalize the regional Hawaiian chiefdoms and
those elsewhere across Polynesia, social labor (mobilized by
chiefs) built religious monuments as a hierarchy of temples
that marked the landscape and determined responsibilities of
individual communities to support annual ceremonies (Kolb
1994). The eventual creation of divine kingship was depen-
dent on elaborate ceremonies, supported by surpluses made
possible by the large island areas and their productive soilsThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tmunity lands, their facilities, and staple production. A retinue
of specialists involved in land management, warrior might,
and religious sanctification was supported by surpluses and in
turn worked to support the institutions of chiefly rule (Earle
1978).
Prestige goods were an essential part of the Hawaiian polit-
ical economy and reinforced a class-based ideology. The Ha-
waiian objects included the famous feather cloaks, helmets,
and other paraphernalia of the ruling chiefs, clothes of the
gods (Earle 1987). Additionally, whale-tooth pendants, spe-
cial woven mats, elaborately decorated tapa cloth, beautiful
wooden bowls and utensils, weapons, and elaborately carved
religious sculptures were part of the chiefly and religious
material culture. By and large, these items were made of
materials that were broadly available, and the technology of
manufacture was not exceptionally complicated, although
highly skilled and knowledgeable specialists would certainly
have been involved. These items were not linked to a world
system of trade because of the extreme isolation of the Ha-
waiian Islands. Rather, the materials for prestige goods were
obtained locally or from adjacent chiefdoms, and then crafts-
people supported by the chiefs produced these items. This
is in marked contrast to Europe, where the most important
prestige goods were made of metal, amber, jet, and shells ob-
tained from great distances. The model of a prestige-goods
economy formulated for Europe, therefore, is not applicable in
its specifics to the Hawaiian case.
The production and trade of symbolic paraphernalia was
an extension of staple finance, not an independent mode of
economic mobilization (Cordy 2003). In the annual collec-
tion from communities, the high chiefs demanded special
products like bird feathers, bark cloth, and dyes. Artisans
who transformed these materials into symbolic objects were
supported within the chief ’s household or received land in
return for their skilled labor. The prestige goods thus con-
verted staple surplus into objects of significance used to de-
fine the status of chiefs and to assert their religious legitimacy.
The feathered cloaks were especially important, apparently
produced for the paramount chief, who distributed them to
supporting chiefs. These special goods became props in the
ceremonies and dress of the high chiefs as god-kings. Addi-
tionally, the production of warrior canoes and special weap-
ons helped to solidify control over the warriors, so important
for conquest.
Another potential point of control existed over the tech-
nology used to manufacture symbolic objects and weapons.
The basalt used for adzes (for woodworking) was available
on all islands, but high-quality basalts appear to have been
restricted to certain sources and traded between islands (Lass
1998). These traded basalts were concentrated in elite resi-
dences and religious shrines (Kirch et al. 2012), suggesting
that chiefly networks dominated their distribution and use
to sculpt god images and other paraphernalia for temples9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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and to build warrior canoes and other weapons. The inter-
polity trade may have reinforced control over the manufac-
ownership created some opportunities for surplus extraction.
At the same time, commoners maintained strong (although
528 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015ture of critical objects, but, because of local alternatives, it
would not have been a primary bottleneck in the political
economy.
To summarize, the low-density colonizing populations of
Hawai‘i probably formed a fairly open society initially, al-
though ideas of status were surely retained. The subsequent
population expansion filled the landscape and intensified its
use, creating circumscribed zones of highly productive agri-
culture claimed by a ruling elite. Substantial surpluses sup-
ported managers, warriors, and priests in the process of in-
stitutional reformulation. The agency of commoners should,
however, never be discounted. As in Vanuatu, alternatives for
movement within and between the Hawaiian Islands would
always have mitigated chiefly autocracy. A bargain between
chiefs and commoners created surplus extraction that, at the
same time, required chiefs to maintain a moral economy with
well-managed farming systems, access to wild resources of
uplands and sea, and ceremonial legitimacy. Although the
chiefs of Hawai‘i crafted exceptional central power, the need
for the labor power of commoners never made them simple
pawns in the process.
Conclusions
A political economy approach to prehistoric sequences of-
fers a foundational understanding of alternative pathways to
complexity. Along with ecological methods, the theory of po-
litical economy has strong general applicability for under-
standing social evolution. The political economy in all of its
manifestations financed the development of sources of power
that extend chiefly authority and solidify polities with popu-
lations in the high hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands
and beyond. The Marxist tradition of historical materialism
appears to have exceptional promise for explaining long-term
change, and we argue for a renewed elaboration of this estab-
lished tradition of scholarship, using the rich archaeological
record now being produced.
The prehistory sequences of the Pacific illustrate how var-
iation in political economy (an outcome of ecological, topo-
graphic, epidemiological, technological, structural, and other
historical factors) created the engine that resulted in wide
variability in political forms, despite common historical and
technological conditions. Within a few thousand years, the
people of the Pacific developed political institutions that
ranged across the spectrum from egalitarian societies to local
chiefdoms, regional chiefdoms, and state-like polities. Our
paper highlights different bottlenecks in the production and
distribution of staples and wealth goods as critical to gener-
ating diverse political forms. Alternative control points varied
in their potentials to channel surplus flows. Whether it was
canoes for distant travels or military adventures, the con-
struction of monuments materializing a ceremonial landscape,
or the engineered facilities of intensive (often irrigated) agri-
cultural systems, the establishment of overarching systems ofThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tvariable) abilities to counter or benefit from central author-
ity. The patterns observed are highly dynamic and constantly
negotiated.
We propose that, for Lapita, the uncertain bottleneck was
based on voyaging with wealth-like exchanges of esoteric
knowledge. Subsequently for the western Pacific, a critical con-
straint to power resulted from density-dependent malaria. In
Island Melanesia, the most powerful chiefdoms were based
on staples mobilized from engineered landscapes without
malaria. In much of northern Vanuatu, no obvious control
points existed, but, given the volcanically enriched soils suit-
able for dry land agriculture, agricultural production became
channeled by chiefs into competitive pig production for
feasting and ritual exchange. Ambitious individuals could ma-
nipulate such a system by borrowing and lending high-value
“engineered” pigs, but it was a fluid and unstable means to
concentrate power. In Polynesia, where the absence of malaria
meant that the demographic brakes were off, staple finance
systems reached fullest potential in Hawai‘i.
TheHawaiian case illustrates clearly the dynamics by which
a corporate society can develop strict stratification based on
ownership of land. A recent distinction between corporate
and network societies provides a useful reformulation of
political economy in prehistory (Blanton and Fargher 2008;
Blanton et al. 1996), but the Hawaiian case shows that cor-
porate ownership of land could be largely erased by warrior
might and religious ideology that ruptured structural bonds
of local laborers to their land. Intensive irrigation systems
developed by local communities created the conditions for
surplus extraction that supported the means of social refor-
mulation as a highly stratified society.
More generally, we have shown that by using a science-
based method to social evolution, grand narratives become
possible by drawing on the intellectual foundations of Marx
and Childe. Social theories such as these help to make sense
of new evidence and to provide research plans that direct
our efforts to recover the needed evidence to modify these
theories. The time is right for attention to the longue durée.
Political economy approaches will not be stage based but will
show how common processes of resource control help explain
the specifics of social history. Hopefully, theymay also suggest
future opportunities to reduce social inequalities through an
understanding of the past.
Coda
Misperceptions that the rise of chiefdoms is inevitable and
that the institutionalization of chiefdoms determines a class
of rulers easily surface. Neither is correct. We argue that the
rise of chiefdoms and subsequent states is rather exceptional,
dependent on specific conditions. The process is reversible,
and the dynamics are both variable and precarious. Founda-
tional is the political economy, but that foundation is human
authored and unstable. It depends on diverse and episodic9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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conditions that can just as easily increase or decline in social
complexity. Alternative pathways always exist.
Lecture, which honors Jack Golson, a founder of Pacific ar-
chaeology and long-term Marxist, not unlike Australia’s V.
Comments
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 529There are would-be chiefs waiting in the wings, and de-
scent is never in itself enough to be accepted as a chief.
Chiefs must demonstrate both their capability and legiti-
macy. The role is always performative. An example drawn
from the death in 2011 of a chief from northern Vanuatu
illustrates the indeterminacy of succession. One hundred
days after the chief ’s death, a major ceremony represents the
official end of mourning except for the close family. This
chief was the eldest son of his predecessor, adopted soon
after birth. The eldest biological son, a considerable chief in
his own right, harbored resentment for his adopted brother’s
presumption of paramount status. On the ninety-ninth day
of mourning, he seized the moment to organize a pig-killing
memorial ceremony for his brother, at which he dispatched
10 full-circle tusker pigs. The event was commemorated by
the erection of 10 megalithic stelae at his men’s house. Few
in the area had thought that he could carry it off. He was old
and in ill health; many considered him yesterday’s man. But
he had spent years quietly planning for such a moment. All
his debts were called in to acquire the highest-esteemed
livoala pigs. Such performative acts are always risky; pigs can
be promised but not delivered, and only loyal supporters nec-
essarily want the event to succeed.When it went off as planned,
one naysayer became so out of sorts that he suffered a heart
attack and had to be medevaced from the island. As the 100th
day dawned, the region woke up to a new undisputed para-
mount chief in what amounted to a pig-enforced coup d’état.
The new paramount’s eldest son has paid most of the
construction costs of the church in the central village and
organized rebuilding of the men’s house subsequent to the
pig-killing ceremony. Both he and his father were prominent
in the ceremonies attendant to the latter’s reopening. Mean-
while, the children of the recently deceased paramount have
not been idle. One was elected as the local member of par-
liament, and the untimely death of his party president ele-
vated him to that role, too. He is building a large, permanent
house in the central village, having gained a toehold during
his father’s life. Another son is a high-ranking civil servant.
The open rivalry between their side of the family and that of
the new paramount enlivens many a village community meet-
ing and has led to the exchange of lawyer’s letters. Chiefs are
not dying away any time soon, and the performances con-
tinue. But these performances are not simply visual acts. They
require strategic organization and expenditure of vast re-
sources that test individual capacities as would-be chiefs. Ele-
mentally, these performances establish and calibrate a person’s
place in the political economy—a prerequisite for present and
future political survival.
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A political economy approach to better understand long-term
social evolution in Oceania, a culture area that has not played
a significant role in recent anthropological theory building,
should be a welcome addition to the literature. But the article
by Earle and Spriggs fails to deliver. While I agree that ar-
chaeology should be dedicated to building a “science-based”
understanding of human history and that the concept of
“bottlenecks” can facilitate our understanding of the develop-
ment of social complexity, I part with the authors on their in-
sistence that a Marxist paradigm represents the way forward
and that a science-based understanding can be achieved within
this paradigm.
For me, a scientific epistemology involves developing and
testing hypotheses and theories using empirical observations.
Hence, a scientific approach would entail using archaeologi-
cal data (from Oceania) to systematically test Marxist pre-
dictions. However, instead of testing theMarxist paradigm (as
well as much of the environmental determinism of the neo-
evolutionist paradigm), the authors accept its assumptions
and assertions unquestioningly. In the process, they ignore
much important scholarship from the past 30 years. This
approach brings to mind Thurston’s (2010) astute observa-
tion that “without an explicit orientation toward the study of
how power ‘works,’ ideas about political organization are
often introduced simply by repeating the rationalizations of
earlier approaches, read, re-read, and internalized over many
decades, perpetuating a narrow understanding of the ways
in which political power can be constituted and expressed”
(194).9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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Such narrowness, both theoretically and empirically, is on
display throughout the essay. First, the political economy of
was important on Aneityum, but production and control of
prestige goods (e.g., pig tusks ornaments and rambaramp)
Gary M. Feinman
Integrative Research Center, Science and Education, Field Museum
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sidered to be accidents of environmental factors (environ-
mental determinism) or strategic action used by chiefs to
dominate society. Such an approach fails to consider the full
range of behavioral implications. Drawing on the authors’
example, a chief could build a fortification on a trade route,
but what value does this major infrastructural investment
provide if merchants simply alter their routes? Furthermore,
individuals may recognize the potential costs to them of chiefly
bottlenecks and work collectively (i.e., cooperate) to impede
them. Thus, theoretical development on the role of bottlenecks
must consider the potential responses from, as well as the
limitations they potentially pose for, all members of society,
not just chiefs.
In the Lapita case, when the authors failed to find an em-
pirically verifiable bottleneck, they looked for unverifiable ex-
planations (e.g., control over ocean-going vessels) instead of
considering alternative pathways because, apparently, the ma-
terial complexity of Lapita had to be the result of chiefly com-
petition. I would argue that the data could indicate that La-
pita societies intentionally selected mediums that could not be
monopolized as part of collective political economy strategies
that emphasized inclusive group membership (lineages, sibs,
phratries, etc.; for comparative collective cases, see, e.g., Blan-
ton et al. 1999; Leach 1954; Liu 2004; Morgan 1901; Peregrine
2001; Stein 1994; Swanton 1928).
In the Vanuatu and Hawaiian cases, the authors ignore a
massive amount of empirical data to the contrary (e.g., Blan-
ton and Fargher 2008; Erickson 1999; Lansing 1987, 2009;
Lansing and Kremer 1993; Ostrom 1990; Trawick 2001;
Twitchett 1979) and assume that elites benefited from pop-
ulation pressure and circumscription to control irrigation sys-
tems and coerce farmers. Besides the obvious problems with
population pressure, Blanton and I (2008:273–274) have shown
that the circumscription and exploitation model does not en-
joy empirical support (collective action total regressed against
exit opportunity, r p 20.44, P ! .05, n p 30). Empirical
observations show that farmers, with limited emigration op-
tions, will negotiate, practice noncompliance, and/or rebel in
order to resist elite exploitation (Blanton and Fargher 2008).
Apparently, where farmers are heavily invested in the land-
scape, they tend to drive off or kill leaders that do not adhere
to social contracts instead of emigrating. For example, in the
case of Tonga (where permanent cultivation of manioc and
taro occurred in fenced fields; see Cook 1967), “chiefs who
did extract goods and services, regardless of return—were met
with assassination or a popular rebellion that installed some-
one who acted more in keeping with chiefliness” (Gailey
1987:251).
In this light, it is interesting that there appears to be a
geographical disconnect between intensive agriculture and a
heavy emphasis on prestige goods (especially pig tusks) and
conquest warfare. In Vanuatu, capital-intensive agricultureThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Twere much more important on Malakula, which the authors
link to a Polynesian world system. In the case of Hawai‘i,
highly intensive agriculture was common onO‘ahu and Kaua‘i,
but competitive chiefs, pig production, and conquest warfare
figures more prominently in the descriptions of Maui and the
Big Island, where dryland farming and pigs predominated. It
would appear that chiefly wealth and power were disconnected
from control over irrigation systems in Oceania.
Although the authors claim that they reject unilineal ex-
planations, chiefly control of bottlenecks is the only pathway
to complexity considered. I think there is much potential for
developing a nonlineal perspective on complexity in Oceania,
but the Marxist paradigm advocated by the authors impedes
its development.of Natural History, 1400 South Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois
60605, USA (gfeinman@fieldmuseum.org). 14 I 15
Earle and Spriggs make an important contribution through
a selective retooling of the political economy frame and its
application to three preindustrial archaeological sequences
from the Pacific’s past. A paradigmatic reflection is in order,
as the tempo, volume, and quality of archaeological knowl-
edge creation has outpaced the reflective construction and con-
sensual application of effective theoretical frameworks (Car-
ballo, Roscoe, and Feinman 2014; Kristiansen 2014). Here, I
focus on theory with less attention to the cases under study, as
my familiarity with Oceania’s longue durée is limited.
The authors outline a suite of conceptual tenets that can
be built on productively. They call for a “science-based un-
derstanding” of human history that extends from the deep
past to the present. At the same time, they eschew unilin-
ear sequences while recognizing that we should focus on the
shared processes that effect long-term change along alterna-
tive pathways. The dynamic and diverse social networks and
interpersonal tensions that juxtapose leaders and followers
are viewed as a key, with special emphasis on the varying fis-
cal underpinnings of governance, leadership, and power. Al-
though not a primary focus, Earle and Spriggs also recognize
that the comparative examination of long-term human his-
tory requires a multiscalar vantage.
Of particular significance is the authors’ explicit analytical
consideration of nonelite agency, a conceptual step too rarely
afforded by archaeologists in previous processual and polit-
ical economy approaches to the preindustrial past (Feinman
2013). Nevertheless, I question the prevailing presumption
that the means of production—especially land and associated
investments, including terraces and water management—are,
in general, directly controlled as an undergird of power.9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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Agrarian intensification need not be a top-down process
(Erickson 2006; Netting 1993; Ostrom 1992; Wilken 1987),
ership of land, wealth, or property. The economic founda-
tions of large networks of human cooperation were not al-
Maurice Godelier
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texts, even where considerable differentials in power existed
(Feinman and Nicholas 2012; Smith 1996:77–79).
Rather, from the perspective of collective action approaches
(Blanton and Fargher 2008; Levi 1988; Olson 1965), the fis-
cal foundations of governance often are not grounded strictly
in direct ownership but through a suite of reciprocal social
and economic relations between commoners and leaders. It
is through these “social contracts” that leaders exact labor
and resources from producers, while a portion of that sur-
plus is then distributed as public goods and services that
benefit larger cooperative endeavors. The more rulers depend
directly on their immediate sustaining populations for their
support, the more agency and voice that populace is likely to
be able to assert, the more corporate/collective governance is
apt to be, and the more public goods are likely to be dispersed.
This dynamic may underlie the empirical co-occurrence of
agricultural intensification features (terracing and irrigation)
and monumental construction (public goods, such as roads,
fortifications, temples, and meeting places), aptly noted by
Earle and Spriggs but left unexplained (Blanton and Fargher
2008:254).
Alternatively, the monopolization or direct control of re-
sources affords the powerful with greater opportunity to act
in less collective, autocratic ways as they become less reliant
on the exaction of labor or goods from their internal pop-
ulace, and so they may afford them less voice. From my
reading of the Earle and Spriggs account, this more auto-
cratic practice of rule does not seem characteristic of the
Pacific cases under study with the exception of the end of the
Hawaiian sequence, when power was most highly central-
ized. What is important is that this transition and the re-
sultant amassing of more concentrated power seems to be
undergirded both by a greater reliance on military conquest
and associated spoils (Kirch 2010) and by retinues of attached
craftworkers, who produced status items that could be worn
or handed out by rulers to procure allies and favor. From the
standpoint of the collective action frame, key shifts in the
fiscal underpinnings of power had implications not just for
the hierarchical complexity of late Hawai‘i’s ruling authori-
ties but for the nature of the dyadic relations between lead-
ers and followers from more to less collective forms of gov-
ernance.
Through their more explicit affording of nonelite agency,
Earle and Spriggs have productively repositioned the polit-
ical economy theoretical approach in archaeology. By so do-
ing, they begin to address the micro-macro problem (Schel-
ling 2006): that macroprocesses have bases in micromotives.
Like Earle and Spriggs, I see the ties that link principals and
followers as well as the fiscal processes that underpin the
nature and practice of leadership as crucially important. But
preindustrial power and the institutions of governance need
not always rest squarely on direct economic control or own-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tways the consequence of political command, elite control, or
centralized state ownership; rather, preindustrial economies
were much more variable (Blanton 2013; Feinman and Gar-
raty 2010; Smith 2004). The recognition of that diversity is
critical to understand and explain history’s alternative path-
ways in comparative terms.avenue de France, Paris 75013, France (maurice.godelier@ehess.fr).
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Earle and Spriggs’s article is a plea to archeologists to adopt,
or readopt, a Marxist approach in their discipline. The au-
thors invoke Karl Marx and Gordon Childe but reassure us
that they are not asking us to impose a priori schemas on
historical facts envisaged over the long duration, that pro-
cesses are “reversible,” that there are always other paths, that
there is not a necessary succession of “stages,” that the rise
of chiefdoms is not inevitable, and so on. The authors are
therefore not seeking mechanically to link causes and effects,
as was often the case between 1960 and 1980, when various
versions ofMarxism exerted a strong pull on the social sciences.
But what concepts do they propose for activating a refur-
bished Marxist approach? I see two: political economy and
economic bottleneck, also termed constriction point. I will
first take the concept of political economy, which they define
as “an outcome of ecological, topographic, epidemiological,
technological, structural, and other historical factors,” a list
of totally heterogeneous factors that, through their inter-
relations, “created the engine that resulted in wide variability
in political forms.” This definition fails to advance any hy-
pothesis as to the relations of cause and effect that led certain
of these factors, individually or together with others, to bring
about new forms of political power. We are a long way from
Marx, who defined political economy in a more restrictive
fashion as the combination of social relations of production
that position individuals and groups with respect to access to
and control of the means of production (land, labor, etc.) as
well as access to and control of the use and circulation of the
products of labor—and the productive, intellectual (cogni-
tive), and materials forces involved in the various labor pro-
cesses—the production process unfolding each time within a
definite ecological context.
It is therefore necessary to explain the different positions
these individuals and groups occupy at a given time and in
a given social structure in the production processes. This is
where we must take a closer look at the notion of constric-
tion point. As I understand it, those who possess power can,
under certain circumstances, control and restrict the access
of other members of their social group to land and other re-9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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sources essential for the reproduction of the society (pres-
tige goods, large fishing or war canoes, etc.). It is thus nec-
Lapita civilization of the first settlers of these South Pacific
islands. If the large potteries adorned with geometrical mo-
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this power must place the other members of the society in
a relationship of dependence, such that they are forced to
accept that access to and use of the resources essential to the
life of all are controlled and restricted by those who possess
the power.
What powers in these societies and at these periods in
time could have brought the constituent groups to depend
on the individuals who exercised such powers? To my mind,
it must have been in the first place powers arising from re-
ligious and ritual functions, because these powers were con-
ceived and experienced as being beneficial for everyone. They
held out the promise of good harvests, successful fishing,
safe navigation, women’s fertility, and so on. It was therefore
in conjunction with such “immaterial” services that a set of
obligations could have arisen with respect to those who ex-
ercised these functions. There was therefore no need at this
stage to resort to force to create these obligations, which
translated into countergifts, produce, labor, services, and so
on. Yet it seems that the Austronesian groups that were to
become the Polynesian peoples left their homelands in Tai-
wan and southern China with representations of the world
that already contained the idea that some men were imbued
with exceptional powers enabling them to communicate with
the spirits and the gods, a mana of sorts, and that they could
place these powers at the service of everyone. But these pow-
ers precede any transformation of economic relations, and
these relations cannot explain the powers, either directly or
indirectly.
Alternatively, the exercise of these powers can indeed
transform economic relations. For if the countergift for the
(immaterial) services provided by ritual specialists are pro-
duce, labor, services, and so on, that means that those who
provide these countergifts must produce not only their own
means of existence but also a surplus for those who exercise
the political and religious functions. It is the appropriation
and extension of this surplus that will become the strategic
variable in the extension and transformation of the forms of
power exercised. The surplus appropriated and transformed
by those who hold these powers into their own material and
social conditions of existence is thus the strategic variable
that would explain the variability of political forms, taking
into account the capacities of those who do not exercise these
powers to resist growing pressure to “give” evenmore to those
who do. This hypothesis concerning the conditions of ex-
traction and expansion of a surplus used by a dominant mi-
nority for the purpose of their own social and material re-
production was central to the original Marxist theory, and
the present authors have adopted and exploited it successfully,
it seems to me, in comparing the three societies they have
chosen.
A number of questions come to mind at this point, but I
will choose only one: that of the rapid disappearance of theThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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these populations had both ritual specialists and artists ca-
pable of making such vessels, what then does the disappear-
ance of these ceramics mean? Did they disappear because
the rites were abandoned and the social hierarchy they in-
volved disappeared with them? Perhaps. But what would that
mean in terms of history and anthropology? After this dis-
appearance, societies would have found themselves more egal-
itarian than before but would still have the idea that some
men possessed mana, that there was something divine about
them. The process whereby a social hierarchy would be reborn
that placed at the top of society those who exercised the re-
ligious functions, performed the rites, and claimed to ensure
well-being and justice for everyone in exchange for their labor
and their submission could only start over again. Earle and
Spriggs show this clearly, which is another important point
in their comparisons.California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA (kirch@berkeley.edu).
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I applaud Earle and Spriggs’s effort to redeploy a Marxist
approach to the interpretation of prehistoric change in the
Pacific Islands. In spite of promising insights offered by Fried-
man (1981) and others, a Marxist approach has never been
fully developed in the Pacific, as indeed the potential analyt-
ical power of Marx’s theory of precapitalist social formations
has been largely ignored by mainstream “processual” archae-
ology. Earle and Spriggs emphasize the identification of what
they call bottlenecks in ancient Pacific political economies:
“constriction points in commodity chains,” which were tar-
geted by chiefs or other individuals and manipulated for eco-
nomic gain and/or power.
I restrict my comments here to the case of Hawai‘i, to
which I have devoted many years of research (Kirch 1985,
2010, 2012). While agreeing with much of what Earle and
Spriggs write about Hawai‘i, I do not think they have taken a
Marxist approach far enough. In particular, I am surprised
that they do not fully explore the emergence in late precon-
tact Hawai‘i of true exogamous classes and therefore also
of class struggle. After all, as they themselves quote Marx
and Engels: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class struggles” (2012 [1848]).
Their model of the transformation of Hawaiian society
builds on Earle’s earlier work (1997), which characterized
Hawai‘i as a “staple economy” based on intensified agricul-
tural production. Ruling elites took control of the bottle-
neck between the production and distribution of foodstuffs,
channeling surpluses into their own storehouses to support9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
erms and Conditions
“managers, warriors, and priests in the process of institu-
tional reformulation.” This is fine as far as it goes, but in my
control and distribution of such sumptuary items that pre-
occupied the chiefs, far more than control over food pro-
Dean Saitta
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ogamous classes and (2) underestimates the extent to which
a “prestige-goods” economy was grafted onto the underly-
ing staple economy in the past 2 centuries prior to European
contact.
Across the breadth of Polynesia, only Hawai‘i (and prob-
ably also Tonga) saw the emergence of true exogamous classes
out of an older, ancestral Polynesian social structure of ram-
ifying descent groups. By the time of European contact in
Hawai‘i, these classes—nā li‘i, the chiefs, and nā kanaka, the
commoners—constituted what Marshall Sahlins described
as a “genuine political society” (1999:23). The social relations
of production as well as the control over the means of pro-
duction (to invoke those key Marxian analytical categories)
had been profoundly restructured. Nā li‘i did more than just
extract surplus at the bottleneck, they took absolute control
of land—the very means of production. This change, from
land being controlled by descent groups to one in which chiefs
held territories and commoners paid obligatory tribute (tax)
in exchange for the right to work the land, could not have been
more fundamental, setting up precisely the conditions for
class struggle that Marx predicted.
Earle and Spriggs’s simple remark that the agency of Ha-
waiian commoners should “never be discounted” does not do
justice to the potential for a true Marxian analysis of class
struggle in Hawai‘i. Native Hawaiian historian David Malo
wrote that “many kings have been put to death by the people
because of their oppression of the makaainana [common-
ers]” (1951:195). Kirch and Sahlins (1992) documented abun-
dant examples of commoner resistance to excessive nā li‘i
demands in their study of O‘ahu’s Anahulu Valley (such as
the mixing of goat dung into taro paste destined for the
household of the high chiefess). Although these examples de-
rive from the immediate postcontact period, they almost cer-
tainly reflect the continuance of class struggles that began in
precontact times.
Although Earle and Spriggs recognize that “prestige goods
were an essential part of the Hawaiian political economy,”
they seem reluctant to pursue this further, opining that the
“model of a prestige-goods economy” is not applicable to
Hawai‘i. I beg to differ. While it is certainly the case that in
its earlier stages of development the Hawaiian political econ-
omy was based on the intensification of agricultural produc-
tion (in both irrigated and dryland zones), substantial evi-
dence supports the argument that as the size and power of
the chiefly class expanded dramatically after AD 1600, a sig-
nificant prestige-goods economy began to be grafted onto
the base staple economy. These prestige goods included first
and foremost the elaborate featherwork (capes, cloaks, hel-
mets, etc.) but also all kinds of other craft goods (ranging
from wooden bowls, fine mats, and barkcloth to war canoes)
manufactured by specialists residing in the royal centers. I
would argue that by the time of European contact it was theThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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(konohiki). And, following European contact, this empha-
sis on prestige goods led directly to a “political economy of
grandeur” (Sahlins 1990), based on the competitive impor-
tation of European goods.146-S, 2000 East Asbury Street, Denver, Colorado 80208, USA
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The great virtue of the archaeological record is its potential
to illuminate alternative ways of organizing social life of which
we have no direct experience. For some of us, the Marxist
tradition of political economy is very helpful in drawing out
this variation. Marx is getting lots of attention today given
deepening social inequality worldwide. But he has always
been relevant for scholars interested in understanding the
different ways that humans mobilize social (surplus) pro-
duction. Marxian concepts capture causal powers that other
approaches do not. Among other things, they allow us to see
variation around basic themes where other approaches see
distinct evolutionary types or stages. Thus, I completely agree
with Earle and Spriggs that now is a good time to renew our
engagement with Marxist theory as a means to explain or-
ganizational variation in past societies and, especially, long-
term change.
As the authors note, scholars like Jonathan Friedman were
instrumental in developing a Marxist approach for archae-
ology. Friedman’s signature accomplishment was bringing
Marx and Levi Strauss together to show how kin relationships
can be used to generate social inequality and class exploita-
tion. Even Ian Hodder’s postmodernism played a useful role
in this project. Rather than rejecting materialism, Hodder
helped to enrich it by elaborating the interpretive anthro-
pologist’s fundamental insight that meaning is public and
thus inherently material. By helping to create and reproduce
systems of meaning, material culture is instrumental in sus-
taining the politics and ideologies that support particular
ways of mobilizing social surplus. It is also instrumental in
challenging them. Finally, Eric Wolf ’s particular integration
of the material and the ideal in a broadly Marxist approach
was crucial for turning archaeology in some fruitful theoret-
ical directions for understanding social variation and change.
Earle and Spriggs convincingly demonstrate different path-
ways to power in Pacific social formations that cover the
spectrum from egalitarian to stratified. However, it is not al-
ways clear what surplus mobilization means in their ap-
proach. For Marx, the mobilization of surplus in any kind
of social formation involves a class relationship. He distin-9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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guished between fundamental classes that produce and ex-
tract surplus and subsumed classes that distribute and receive
forms, some of which might have relevance for insurgent
and transformational social movements today.
Peter Sheppard
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economic, political, and cultural conditions that allow fun-
damental class relations to exist. Marx theorized his funda-
mental class relations as primitive communal, feudal, and
capitalist, among others. In so doing, he allowed that power,
property, and class are different relationships that can com-
bine and reinforce each other in variable and complex ways.
In Marx’s world, it was possible for communal relations of
surplus production to coexist with chiefly hierarchies and
even state bureaucracies if those holding power helped to
reproduce the conditions that allow communal appropriation
to proceed. In other words, political domination is not nec-
essarily congruent with economic (class) exploitation.
Variation in the form and conditions of communal class
relationships—where society as a whole is the presupposition
for surplus appropriation and distribution—is the convergent
quality that I am inclined to see characterizing the authors’
spectrum of egalitarian to stratified societies in the Pacific. In
their most socially complex cases, the authors refer to “ex-
ploitation,” “rent,” and “feudal-like” relationships. These con-
cepts imply the existence of a class division between producers
and appropriators of surplus, that is, a tributary class rela-
tionship. However, it seems just as reasonable to conceptu-
alize the various specialists involved in land management,
warfare, and religious sanctification as communal subsumed
classes supported by collectively mobilized surpluses. The
same goes for the skilled artisans who manufacture symbolic
objects in exchange for land or support within elite house-
holds. The authors emphasize that political systems across
the Pacific’s spectrum of variation were always unstable, dif-
ficult to maintain, and constantly negotiated. They consis-
tently mention the limits of elite power and emphasize that
primary producers always had agency. Commoners were never
simple pawns in these relationships and could always challenge
hierarchy and vote with their feet “when exploitation became
extreme.”
In short, Earle and Spriggs’s analysis suggests that
throughout the prehistoric Pacific we have political varia-
tion that is consistent with fundamentally kin-communal
class relations of surplus extraction and distribution, that
is, a kin-communal mode of production. Rather than sug-
gesting changes or transformations in political economy, the
archaeological record is documenting the tenacity of kin-
communal class relationships in a context where exploitative
class relations are always threatening to break out (and may
have, from time to time). If so, then what Earle and Spriggs
theorize and empirically substantiate is interesting and valu-
able. I am not sure that their approach will suggest concrete
ways to reduce contemporary social inequalities. However,
their analysis might prompt more and better critical reflec-
tion about how the past is different from the present. It could
even show us how fundamentally nonexploitative relations
of surplus appropriation can take a multiplicity of complexThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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Processual archaeology was strongly influenced by the work
of Sahlins, particularly his 1963 article “Poor Man, Rich
Man, Big-Man, Chief.” I am not certain, however, how many
read it closely. Sahlins cautions in a footnote that these types
are generalizations and that there was a great deal of social
complexity in Melanesia. His big-man model was influenced
by the work of Douglas Oliver on Bougainville (Oliver 1955),
and his caution may have come in part from Oliver’s rec-
ognition of a cline of social complexity in south Bougain-
ville (Oliver 1956; Thurnwald 1934). In a later paper, Oli-
ver (1971) noted that “from northwest to southeast, a clearly
marked range in emphasis from maternal to paternal ties and
descent is paralleled by a shift in the basis of status hierar-
chy, from kinship and age (north-west) to stress on renown
and a system of inherited class-status.” Oliver proposed a
number of factors, including ecological variation, population
density, and ease of communication, to explain this varia-
tion but also noted the importance of influence from Aus-
tronesian neighbors who may have provided the “reference
model” for status differentiation (Oliver 1971:286). A core
symbolic structure grounded in the concepts of mana and
tapu is found throughout the Austronesian societies of the
Pacific. In the Solomons, such concepts can serve as the
building blocks underpinning elaborations of political econ-
omy, such as the large chiefdom of Roviana in New Georgia
where chiefs, commoners, and slaves lived in dense com-
munities and created a predatory chiefdom that dominated
much of the western Solomons. In simple economic terms,
this was founded not on intensification or appropriation of
surplus but on cultural manipulation of a distributed re-
gional economy (Aswani and Sheppard 2003; Sheppard and
Walter 2013). But symbolic structure is not by itself a suf-
ficient explanation for variation in the Solomons, just as it
was not for Oliver, for whom resource variation and com-
munication were important. But is that alone sufficient to
explain the apparent East Polynesian/Island Melanesian di-
vide? For another Melanesian anthropologist, Roger Keesing,
there had to be some major cultural change to account for
the difference.
The evidence points toward the processes whereby hered-
itary chiefs become transmuted into an aristocratic class in
Polynesia (and some parts of Micronesia) as a key to the
emergence of the metaphysic of mana. It seems not simply
to have been the increasingly godlike status of the highest
chiefs that progressively led to the sanctification of their9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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persons (to which mana and tapu in their most fully de-
veloped forms give expression). I believe that the creation
scription of change on selected Pacific islands. It is an untested
just-so story, and I look forward to a lengthier and more for-
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 535of developed theologies among Oceanic speakers reflects the
emergence of a class of theologians, out of the older Poly-
nesian custodians of lore, ritual, magic and genealogical
knowledge. Theologians as part of the chief ’s entourage,
celebrating and rationalizing the chief ’s sanctity, seems to
have elaborated the cosmological implications of mana into
metaphoric “power.” (Keesing 1984:152)
There are differences between Island Melanesia (Lapita
Land) and Polynesia—signaled most simply by the great
linguistic diversity of Melanesia versus the one language, one
archipelago model of Polynesia—which I suspect are not
simply the result of variation in resource access, bottlenecks,
or malaria. Malaria is endemic to the Solomons and today is
found south into northern Vanuatu, although in the past it
may have been of more limited distribution beyond Near
Oceania (Sheppard 2011). Archaeology indicates that popu-
lations in the western Solomons were, despite malaria, much
higher in the past and possibly as high as that on the very
populous island of Malaita today. And, of course, malaria is
endemic to many areas where states, complex chiefdoms, and
kingdoms were found in Southeast Asia and Africa (Blanton
and Fargher 2008).
Agency is noted as a mechanism of resistance in this pa-
per; however, perhaps the biggest assumption of agency is the
desire by individuals to accumulate power through control
of resources. This seems like a version of the aggrandiser
hypothesis (Hayden 2001). One of Marx’s most powerful
concepts is relations of production, which ultimately con-
strain the development of the means of production. Agency of
individuals, including leaders, is constrained by the relations
of production. The rights to land and its productive capacity
in the Solomons is based on genealogy, and although chiefs
can adjudicate disputes based on control of knowledge, their
ability to alienate land or production is limited and in a con-
stant state of political tension. The modern state of the Sol-
omon Islands has great difficulty in acquiring customary land.
The fundamental rupture of relations of production whereby
chiefs come to own or control land rights seems to have rarely
happened in the Pacific. Perhaps such ruptures are signaled,
as suggested by Keesing, by the development of a class of
theologians who naturalize the control of production by god-
like chiefs or kings.Michael E. Smith
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State
University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA (mesmith9@asu.edu).
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As a materialist who works within a political economy frame-
work, I find little that is objectionable in this generalized de-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tmal account in the future. Two things about this paper puzzle
me. First, why is the approach labeled Marxist? And second,
why are some of the most productive and insightful theoretical
approaches of contemporary materialist research ignored?
Earle and Spriggs note in passing that “much of the US
processual tradition is generally grounded in Marxism,” an
observation that is widely accepted (Trigger 2006). Evolu-
tionary scholars such as Steward and White were hesitant
to acknowledge the Marxist influence on their theories. By
the end of the Cold War, as Service, Harris, and others were
solidifying the neoevolutionary approach in US anthropol-
ogy and archaeology, the Marxist element in their work had
become embedded and implicit. Few neoevolutionary schol-
ars (such as Earle) gave much lip service to the writings of
Marx or referred to their work as Marxist. Yet it is easy to
trace the development of their theories back to Marx.
By now, the pervasive influence of Marx’s ideas on neo-
evolutionary and other materialist approaches in archaeol-
ogy is of interest primarily to historians of archaeology and
self-identifying Marxist scholars. The latter cite the works
of Marx frequently and continue to employ his concepts in
a direct manner today (e.g., McGuire 2008a; Wurst and Mro-
zowski 2014). There is a resurgence of interest in Marx
(Eagleton 2011), to the point that even nonmaterialist inter-
pretivist archaeologist cite him (e.g., Swenson 2014). But if
most materialist archaeologists today do not see the need to
cite Marx directly, why do Earle and Spriggs label their ac-
count Marxist?
I have a small historical quibble with Earle and Spriggs’s
comments on Ian Hodder and the rapid ascendance of post-
processual and antimaterialist ideas in archaeology. They
suggest that one reason for the growth of this movement was
the fragmented nature of historical materialism in the 1970s.
Perhaps. But a more important driver may have been the fact
that Binford and the New Archaeologists hitched their ap-
proach to a discredited and unworkable epistemological band-
wagon: the logical positivism of Hempel and others. Covering-
law explanations simply do not work in the social sciences
(Bunge 2004; Tilly 2008), a notion that was already clear to
philosophers of social science by Binford’s time (Morgan
1973). To me, it looks like materialist accounts in archaeol-
ogy took a back seat to idealist and interpretivist accounts in
large part because the materialists were unable to articulate a
workable epistemology, leaving their explanations in doubt.
My second puzzle with this paper is why large bodies of
useful explanatory theory from materialist, or political econ-
omy, approaches are ignored. Much of this work originates in
other disciplines, and archaeologists are now starting to ex-
plore its implications (Blanton and Fargher 2008; Carballo
2013). Perhaps because US archaeology developed historically
within departments of anthropology, most social theorizing
has been limited to ideas from anthropology and archaeology.
My doctoral training in the late 1970s taught that fields like9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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sociology and political science were irrelevant because their
ideas about modern society are just not applicable to ancient
sequences of strategic actions.” The problem is to identify
which factor operated in a particular situation; if there is no
536 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015societies. After I broke out of this straightjacket less than a
decade ago, my own research and understanding of ancient
cities and states flourished (Smith 2011).
Elsewhere (Smith 2012), I take Patrick Kirch (2010) to task
for labeling the Hawaiian polities as states (I think he is cor-
rect) yet refusing to analyze them with the full social science
toolkit available for the study of state societies. Regardless of
how Earle and Spriggs choose to categorize the societies they
describe, their analysis would be much improved if they ex-
panded their conceptual horizons this way. Here are just two
brief examples. Their discussion of commoner agency would
benefit greatly from the insights of collection action theory
(e.g., Blanton and Fargher 2008), particularly Margaret Levi’s
(1988) concept of quasi-voluntary compliance. Second, the
concepts of wealth and staple finance—very useful when first
articulated (D’Altroy and Earle 1985)—are now clearly in-
adequate to model early fiscal organization, even in nonstate
polities (Kiser and Kane 2007; Monson and Scheidel 2015;
Smith 2004).
My concern with the authors’ use of the term “Marxist”
pertains primarily to the history of archaeology, but my con-
cern with their limited conceptual approach identifies a larger
intellectual problem in contemporary archaeology. We have
been blinded by our strict adherence to the models and the-
ories of anthropology, and we need to incorporate more vig-
orously insights and concepts from the other social sciences.
Otherwise, our understanding of past societies and their trans-
formations will remain parochial and moribund.Jim Specht
Geosciences and Archaeology, Australian Museum, 6 College Street,
Sydney, New South Wales 2010, Australia; and School of Philo-
sophical and Historical Inquiry, University of Sydney, Australia
(jspecht@bigpond.com). 23 I 15
Earle and Spriggs’s attempt to provide a coherent, overarch-
ing theoretical framework is stimulating, but the paper is
overly ambitious, and many issues are oversimplified or ig-
nored. This partly reflects differences in the quantity and
quality of data for the three case studies, of which the Ha-
waiian one is the most convincing. The studies have vastly
different timescales: 300–400 years for Lapita, around 1,000
years for Hawai‘i, and 2,000 years for Vanuatu. Do these
differences have a distorting influence on perceptions and
interpretations of emergence and development of chiefdoms?
Central to the argument are “economic bottlenecks (con-
striction points) based on property rights in land or on pro-
duction and trade in prestige goods,” “commodity chains” of
various kinds, and “control points” over resources for chiefs
and pretenders. Bottlenecks are defined as “unintended con-
sequences of environmental conditions” or “intended con-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Tcase for environmental conditions, does that automatically
mean strategic action was the agency?
The environmental conditions likely to have influenced
social development in the Hawaiian and Vanuatu studies are
clearly stated, but the topic is inadequately discussed for the
section on the Lapita cultural complex. To restrict descrip-
tion of the environmental contexts of Lapita sites to “small
populations . . . located along the beaches on little and large
islands” is reductionist to a fault and fails to acknowledge
the diverse range of contexts of these sites: in the shadow
of active volcanoes, on atolls or uplifted reef islands, and on
islands with complex geology. These islands differ in pro-
ductivity potential, yet the authors skim over the differences
and present the Lapita cultural complex as a uniform entity
across thousands of kilometers of islands and ocean. The
Lapita cultural complex was not uniform; significant differ-
ences exist between sites (Green 1992), but why? Was it due
to environmental factors, the result of strategic choices, or
both? Does the blanket term “Lapita” embrace the material
remains of multiple ethnolinguistic communities (cf. Pawley
2003) and not a set of closely related communities speaking a
single Proto-Oceanic language, as is claimed?
For prestige and wealth goods, the authors acknowledge
the problem of the “ever-present missing record” (Green and
Kirch 1997): items of organic material culture that do not
survive in the archaeological record, or only rarely so (cf. New
Zealand; Irwin 2004). The list of such items is extensive
in the New Guinea region in recent times (Harding 1994),
where they played substantial roles in diverse economic and
social relationships. With the mats and feathers discussed
in the paper, their absence from the archaeological record
presents challenges for interpreting past political economies,
just as relying on inorganic goods would be at best incomplete
and misleading.
The authors omit reference to the work of Torrence and
her colleagues on pre-Lapita obsidian stemmed tools in Pa-
pua New Guinea (see references in Torrence, Kelloway, and
White 2013). Production of the finest tools required com-
plex skills and plenty of raw material and occurred in the
Kutau/Bao and Mopir obsidian source areas of New Britain.
Given the significance of New Britain obsidian, some form
of access control must have operated, as in the recent past
(Specht 1981). This would have created bottlenecks, and the
dominance of Kutau/Bao obsidian in Lapita sites arguably
reflects this. With the restriction of access to Mopir following
the W-K2 eruption (Summerhayes et al. 1998), Kutau/Bao
became the New Britain source of choice. The authors dis-
miss the obsidian in Lapita sites as potential prestige items but
miss the point. Value and prestige were not necessarily in-
herent in the obsidian per se or in the items made from it
but were inherent in the capacity of individuals to acquire it
from a great distance and then distribute and use it uneco-
nomically (Specht 2002, pace Sheppard 1993).9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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The paper does not discuss the Bismarck archipelago be-
fore Lapita pottery, yet some form of social differentiation
of evaluating bottlenecks itself means that the authors are
not quite able to describe “how dominant control was effec-
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 537appears to have existed in some parts (Torrence, Kelloway,
and White 2013; Torrence and Swadling 2008; Torrence,
White, and Kononenko 2013). Were the simple chiefdoms of
Lapita introduced along with pottery, did they owe some-
thing to the prior conditions in the archipelago, or did they
develop independently? Not all Lapita settlements were nec-
essarily occupied by simple chiefdoms, but whether the di-
verse leadership systems of recent times (Roscoe 2000) ex-
isted or began at that time is unknown. These questions open
a rich field for future research, and the challenge is to de-
velop strategies to address them.
Despite my negative tone, I believe Earle and Spriggs have
produced a potentially fruitful way forward, especially for
the western Pacific Islands, where scant attention has been
paid to issues of political economy. But we must guard against
assuming that their interpretations are demonstrated. As the
authors state, much more targeted work is needed.Tim Thomas
Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of
Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand (tim.thomas
@otago.ac.nz). 27 I 15
This paper presents a welcome call to retain an examination
of the conditions of social inequality at the center of our ac-
counts of prehistoric Pacific societies. As noted in the con-
clusion, historical materialism lends itself to grand narra-
tives, although Earle and Spriggs disavow inevitability and
unilineality. A comparative scientific endeavour that identifies
recurring mechanisms such as bottlenecks must be claiming
some level of predictability, however, no matter how complex
the reality. The cross-cultural impetus toward stratification in
their account is provided by Machiavellian individuals who
take advantage of the affordances of the productive environ-
ment to control the distribution of staple foods and/or other
items of value. The authors are most comfortable explaining
how this works when control focuses on food production, es-
pecially surplus-producing garden systems. The explanation
works particularly well for Hawai‘i, where the archaeologi-
cal sequence is well understood and social organization ap-
proached the state-level forms for which Marxist and related
critiques of political economy were developed and arguably
remain best suited.
The Melanesian cases are more problematic and explained
mostly by way of comparison, whereby a relative absence of
the conditions of opportunity commonly exploited in chief-
doms explains the relative lack of stratification (or, as in the
Lapita case, is used to argue for a lack of stratification). The
archaeological sequences are less complete, and so developing
accounts of the internal workings of these political economies
may be difficult without a constituting other. But the methodThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
All use subject to JSTOR Ttively resisted to create more decentralized structures”—in-
stead, we mostly get an account of how dominant control
was unable to be effectively pursued.
There is also the question of whether Melanesian social
forms rest on premises about persons, things, and their re-
lations amenable to Marxist analysis. Since the 1980s, neo-
Maussian ethnographies of Melanesian gift economies have
questioned the applicability of concepts of property, alien-
ation, and individuality to political economies in the region,
exemplified by Strathern’s (1988) critique of gender exploi-
tation in Papua New Guinea. A Marxist rejoinder might be
that such critiques identify mystifications that are largely
irrelevant, since the material outcome is the same—products
are appropriated, power inequalities emerge (see Graeber
2001:41). Nevertheless, there is a potential blind spot to the
influence of foundational concepts, categories, and ontolo-
gies in materialist approaches that do not grapple with these
differences.
Take, for example, the role accorded here to inherited
political structures in colonizing populations—the authors
“de-emphasize . . . founding structural principles” in favor
of the postulation that inequity was suspended on newly
settled islands only to emerge anew given the right condi-
tions. The archaeological evidence for imported hierarchies
in colonization-phase sites may be equivocal, but compara-
tive studies of social organization, leadership terms, and re-
source governance across Polynesia strongly suggest that the
people there followed a common set of cultural principles in
political life as populations grew (Kirch and Green 2001).
The radially segmented clan territories of several Polynesian
high islands (e.g., ahupua‘a, tapere) may be seen as a cultural
form that structured power relations—ensuring in-group self-
sufficiency (Kirch 1984:33)—and was a model that could be
scaled up to integrate people and territory. A contrast is pro-
vided by Melanesian islands with opposing inland and coastal
landholding groups that engaged in reciprocal exchange to ac-
cess a full range of resources. The irrigated taro systems of
New Georgia did not facilitate the emergence of regionally in-
tegrated chiefdoms, remaining reciprocally dependent on ex-
change with coastal communities, and in late prehistory were
abandoned in favor of a coastally dominant political economy
focused on shell valuables and symbolic headhunting expedi-
tions (Sheppard, Walter, and Nagaoka 2000; Thomas 2009).
The Melanesian ideal of reciprocity is also seen in the reputa-
tion of Roi Mata as a chief who achieved peace via a legendary
feast—warring parties brought different food items that subse-
quently became their clan symbols or totems in the naflak sys-
tem (Luders 2001:256). According to local conception, then,
integration was achieved not with specialized warriors but
through balanced reciprocity in a system of settled differences.
Violence in many Melanesian societies was deployed as a tool
to delimit social groups (Harrison 1993) rather than enforce
integration. Gift exchange is so effective at entangling people9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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that the problem becomes how to create boundaries or cut the
network (Strathern 1996). In New Georgia, where gift
it serves analytically to shape a research agenda by pin-
pointing key parameters requiring future archaeological re-
538 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015exchange made resource redistribution between allied tribes
appear as a form of familial sharing, chiefs conducted head-
hunting raids that simultaneously demonstrated the mana (ef-
ficacy) of their lineages while setting limits to affiliation. Sur-
rounding territories were depopulated rather than expanded
into. Political power emerged under cultural conditions that
resisted alienation.
In drawing attention to the role played by prevailing con-
ceptual schemes I do not mean to suggest that these are more
influential than factors like environmental biodiversity or
epidemiological population limits in shaping political orga-
nization. But we do need methods that can detect these
sorts of differences in the archaeological record; otherwise, we
risk portraying alternative political structures as more or less
impoverished versions of states.ReplyThe depth, thoughtfulness, care, and creativity of the com-
ments to our article are greatly appreciated. All contribute to
the further development of theory and explanation in Pacific
archaeology and beyond. They equally support a science-
based, comparative approach to archaeological sequences of
sociocultural change. This agreement is important; it ar-
gues strongly that archaeology can now look systematically
at processes of social evolution after the recent deflation of
the postprocessual balloon. As the commentators suggest,
research by an eclectic (and for want of a better word) pro-
cessual archaeology can finally bury the straw man of uni-
linear, stage-based formulations previously constructed solely
with ethnographic cases. As noted by Feinman, the rapidly
improving archaeological record creates a rich opportunity
to fashion a theory-driven understanding of social evolu-
tion. Such a comparative approach to the longue durée can be
one of anthropology’s signature pillars supporting a science-
based understanding of the human experience. Only archae-
ologists can do this. We envision anthropological archaeology
as a robust, historical science studying common processes
with specific evolutionary sequences.
Fargher correctly argues that “a scientific approach would
entail using archaeological data . . . to systematically test Marx-
ist predictions.” Then, rather disingenuously, he says that we
“accept . . . [Marxist] assumptions and assertions unquestion-
ingly.” His statement misrepresents our article, which we see
as the critical research step of model construction based on
existing data that were often collected for purposes of culture
history. Our hypothetical model—what Smith calls a just-so
story—is not meant as a statement of purported facts; rather,This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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a Pacific archaeology field that has perhaps become rather
stultified of late in its theoretical development. Effective re-
search must be guided by theory so as to identify key data,
such as those related to bottlenecks, that are required to test
and improve the model’s applicability. Constructing a shared
intellectual approach also allows for data collection that can
be more easily compared.
Should we call our approach Marxist? Although recog-
nizing that neoevolutionary anthropologists (Fried, Harris,
Steward, White, Wolf, etc.) and anthropological archaeol-
ogists (Binford, Childe, Earle, Feinman, Flannery, etc.) easily
trace theoretically to Marx, Smith asks pointedly, “But if
most materialist archaeologists today do not see the need
to cite Marx directly, why do Earle and Spriggs label their
account Marxist?” Fargher would seem to see Marxism as
misguided, reminding us of the blind “un-American” view of
Marxist theory once broadly held by US society. Dismiss-
ing Marxism is a mistake, and we hold to the label for two
reasons. First, we want to correct the history of the Ameri-
can neoevolutionary tradition, which for political reasons ob-
scured its Marxist foundations. Second, equivalent to biol-
ogy’s foundational dependence on Darwin’s insights, we want
to encourage a new materialist synthesis that helps to inte-
grate anthropological materialism as a common endeavor with
collective roots, for which Marx was the intellectual leader,
just as Darwin provided the intellectual foundation for mod-
ern biological evolution.
A premise of our article is that materialist approaches
share common principles that make them complementary
(not competitive) with each other. We believe that most “dif-
ferent” approaches to social evolution actually address com-
plementary aspects of the overall topic. Our approach to power
and political control should be fairly clear from the article; we
never imply that it is comprehensive. Central control, for ex-
ample, was never easy or unproblematic; it was always
contested and exercised within existing social formations. To
varying degrees, as well clarified by several commentators, a
balance of bottom-up and top-down dynamics characterizes
traditional societies. Saitta (1997) describes how “collective
action” works in the “subsumed” class systems of traditional
societies as a means to generate surpluses to support the po-
litical structure. He emphasizes that resource extraction and
distribution existed through much of the Pacific as “a kin-
communal mode of production.” Thomas provides informa-
tion that supports this point by emphasizing that our analy-
sis of Lapita and Melanesian societies shows that potential
bottlenecks were not easily controlled. Absolutely. He points
out that Melanesian scholars emphasize that this region had
fundamentally different conceptions of such things as prop-
erty, alienation, and individuality, and he describes a Mela-
nesian pattern of reciprocity that provides a structural alter-9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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native to Polynesian redistribution. Following up on Saitta, we
emphasize that the apparent differences (too simply glossed
his early intellectual formation. Oliver, for example, recog-
nized a cline in social complexity across Bougainville, which
Earle and Spriggs Political Economy in Prehistory 539as Melanesia vs. Polynesia) may be more quantitative than
qualitative and that anymodel of structural division should be
tested by archaeological studies of the sequences. As Thomas
suggests, apparent qualitative differences may obscure simi-
larities in political process.
Kirch provides a useful expansion of our argument that
should be carefully considered. He believes that we do not
take “a Marxist approach far enough . . . [because we] do not
fully explore the emergence in late precontact Hawai‘i of true
exogamous classes and therefore also of class struggle.” He
provides a brief synopsis of his extensive work on this topic
that we embrace. In a close reading of his publications, we
sense that he emphasizes structural transformation more
than the driving forces of political economy, but our differ-
ences are only in emphasis.
Godelier has been a major influence on our intellectual
development, and we welcome his substantial comment to
our article. He raises the question of whether our definition
of political economy includes “a list of totally heterogeneous
factors” that makes it distant from Marx’s elegant definition.
We feel, however, that to apply Marxist concepts broadly we
must expand the totality of economic conditions to include
explicitly environmental and social factors. These factors are
all implicit in Marx’s analysis, but his work was tailored to
an industrial economy, for which these factors were arguably
less significant. Our cause-and-effect relationship is based on
the nature of bottlenecks—how potential constriction points
in economic systems determine the nature of power and
structural control.
Godelier emphasizes the value of our approach by his
consideration of the structural role played by religious lead-
ers as an original source of power in traditional societies. He
sees religious powers as preceding economic powers and pro-
viding the immaterial services that allow for the transfor-
mations of economic relations. As elaboration for the kin-
communal means of production discussed by Saitta, Godelier
extends the theoretical reach of our analysis into the realm of
traditional societies, where bottlenecks were nonexistent or
weak. This extension fits well with our understanding of how
chiefs in Vanuatu were able to elaborate ceremonial cycles
and monument construction to assert some control over
staple production. Monument construction in low-density
societies, such as the European Neolithic or the American
Woodland, suggests a possible religious basis for the political
economy and its social differentiation (M. Artursson, T. Earle,
and J. Brown, unpublished manuscript). This early emergence
of religious power, as seen in the archaeological record, sup-
ports Godelier’s argument.
In his discussion of Melanesian political systems, Sheppard
refers to the foundational thinking of Oliver, Sahlins, and
Roger Keesing—all ethnographers who by chance were pro-
fessors of Earle at Harvard and Michigan and who influencedThis content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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tigate with a political economy approach. Sheppard further
discusses Keesing’s creative emphasis on the role played by
theology in Oceania that resulted in a “class of theologians,”
who could have been leaders in their own right or power spe-
cialists for chiefs.
Ideology can be a strong source of chiefly power when it is
materialized in forms that require production within a con-
trollable political economy (DeMarrais, Castillo, and Earle
1996). The relative roles of the three elemental sources of
power (economic, military, and ideological) have distinct and
variable significance for the emergence of social complexity,
but they are fundamentally linked to dynamics of the po-
litical economy (Earle 1997). We are intrigued by the ways
that both Smith and Saitta contend that our admittedly rather
cavalier dismissal of Hodder is unfair. It is true that Hodder’s
views have changed considerably over the past 30 years, and
it was particularly the initial stages of his postprocessual
journey that we were highlighting. As discussed in his recent
book, Hodder (2012) now emphasizes how material culture
is a public phenomenon that can be understood from a po-
litical economy perspective. Saitta clarifies, “By helping to
create and reproduce systems of meaning, material culture is
instrumental in sustaining the politics and ideologies that
support particular ways of mobilizing social surplus. It is also
instrumental in challenging them.” Exactly. As materialized
in things and constructions, ideology provides means of both
control and resistance, depending on the particular place of
the objects within the production process of the political
economy.
We are encouraged by how the commentators bring the-
oretical perspectives and dynamics that would not easily be
identified as Marxist to complement our approach. Accord-
ing to Smith, “we need to incorporate more vigorously in-
sights and concepts from the other social sciences” in addition
to anthropology. Yes, among the best examples are those from
the Blanton group, who make explicit use of theoretical ar-
guments drawn from political science. We agree with Fein-
man that “the economic foundations of large networks of
human cooperation were not always the consequence of po-
litical command, elite control, or centralized state ownership;
rather, preindustrial economies were much more variable.”
The foundational presentation for their position is Blanton
et al. (1996), where the distinction is drawn between cor-
porate and network strategies. Using political science re-
search, Blanton and Fargher (2008) argue that many tradi-
tional states depend on corporate strategies. Where finance
is internally based (as, e.g., in taxes on land), leaders pro-
vided apparent services to their subject population. In pre-
modern states characterized by “collective action,” common-
ers were able to retain a high degree of self-organizing control
over their lives and require the elite to provide useful services9 on Tue, 8 Sep 2015 12:58:18 PM
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to them. We see the apparent lack of control as a probable
outcome of the particular political economies involved; to the
tive studies of archaeological sequences (Neitzel and Earle
2014).
Adams, R. McC. 1966. The evolution of urban society. Chicago: Aldine.
540 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 4, August 2015degree that leaders depend on commoners for resources and
labor, the commoners’ bargaining position remained strong.
As presented clearly by Feinman, “the fiscal foundations of gov-
ernance often are . . . grounded . . . through a suite of reciprocal
social and economic relations between commoners and lead-
ers.” That is the case even with true class systems in place.
One theme that we touch on briefly is that archaeology’s
concern with the longue durée should be relevant to under-
standing future possibilities for social change. Smith suggests
that this will be possible only if we engage closely with non-
anthropological theory, just as Blanton and Fargher’s work
does so effectively. Although such borrowings definitely en-
rich our discipline, we feel that reciprocally other disciplines
can now gain substantially from archaeological approaches.
For example,HowChiefs Come to Power (Earle 1997) has been
quite broadly read and used by political scientists (see, e.g.,
Winters 2011). As a historical science studying topics of great
general relevance to the social sciences, archaeology can and
should impact broader understandings of and designs for
social change.
Various commentators suggest ways to apply a political
economy approach that we have not fully explored. Perhaps
most salient are those by the Oceanic archaeologists (Kirch,
Specht, Sheppard, and Thomas), who emphasize the impor-
tance of historical details of potential significance to partic-
ular trajectories of regional developments. These points are
well taken; social evolution is a historical science that must
consider such important details in terms of how systems
change, and we make no claim that our model is all inclusive
of relevant evidence. Our model is a point of departure for
future research; we never intended that it should close dis-
cussion but rather that it should renew discussion. Specht
draws attention to the potential for additional bottlenecks
in the Lapita cultural complex, which as yet may be unrec-
ognized as control points. He also draws attention to Tor-
rence’s work on pre-Lapita society lithic production and trade.
The specialized, high-quality production that she documents
suggests a potential local bottleneck that could have been re-
sponsible for some emergent social differentiation. Kirch dis-
cusses the role played by prestige-goods exchange in the later
part of theHawaiian sequence, which certainly deserves further
consideration.
As we read through the comments, our only regret is that
we did not receive more of them. We strongly recommend
reading each comment with great care, as they offer impor-
tant insights, only some of which we have had space to dis-
cuss. We conclude that the overlaps of interests and con-
cerns represented by such a growing cadre of science-based
researchers are quite evident here. Our research naturally
diverges, contests, and complements, but what we share in
common provides a strong foundation. We carry different
research agendas and scales of analysis, but together we can
build a new synthesis of social evolution based on compara-This content downloaded from 130.56.64.2
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